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Congress passed the Clean Air Act in 1963 to protect air resources and promote 
public health and welfare. In 2010 alone, state and federal regulators conducted over 
70,000 inspections and assessed a total of $115 million in penalties under the Clean Air 
Act. Surprisingly, there has been relatively little research into the effectiveness of 
monitoring and enforcement actions. In this dissertation, I investigate the impact of 
monitoring and enforcement actions on air pollution emissions and air quality and 
examine escalating penalties for repeat violations of environmental regulations. 
In Chapter I, I investigate the impact of monitoring and enforcement actions on 
emissions of criteria pollutants and find that penalties decrease emissions. Criteria 
pollutants are commonly found air pollutants that harm human health and the 
environment; yet, due to data limitations, few researchers have studied the impact of 
monitoring and enforcement on criteria pollutant emissions. Using a large dataset of 
nitrogen oxides emissions in California, I find that penalties reduce emissions. Increasing 
the penalty from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of the distribution of positive 
penalties reduces emissions by 1.46 tons and facilities that were assessed a penalty in the 
previous year reduce emissions by 5.60 tons on average. This reduction is approximately 
2.0% to 7.7% of mean facility emissions. Interestingly, inspections have no significant 
impact, likely because inspection rates in California are consistently high.  
In Chapter II, I examine whether monitoring and enforcement actions improve air 
quality. Focusing again on California, I find that penalties are successful at reducing 
ambient ozone concentrations. Previous studies have found that monitoring and 
enforcement improve a facility’s compliance with its pollution permit and reduce its 
2 
emissions, but this alone does not measure the efficacy of the regulatory regime. While 
compliance and emissions are important measures, noncompliance and high emissions do 
not directly harm health and the environment; they do harm by increasing ambient 
pollution. Most of the previous research examining air quality has found that 
nonattainment of federal air quality standards—which implies a more stringent regulatory 
regime—improves air quality. No research has directly examined the impact of 
monitoring and enforcement on air quality. 
I fill that gap in the literature by investigating how monitoring and enforcement 
actions at facilities located near an air quality monitor affect ambient ozone 
concentrations measured at the air quality monitor. I find that increasing penalties 
improves air quality; increasing total penalties assessed from the 25th percentile to the 
75th percentile of the penalty distribution reduces ambient ozone concentrations by 0.348 
parts per billion, a 0.4% reduction in ambient ozone concentrations. 
In Chapter III, I examine the theoretical and empirical support for escalating 
penalties for repeat environmental violations and find that facilities with a history of 
violations are not necessarily the worst polluters as their violations seem to be less severe 
on average. Although escalating penalties for repeat offenders are common, the law and 
economics literature has not fully explored this concept. I argue that existing theoretical 
models could better justify escalating penalties by incorporating fairness and the social 
norm of law compliance.  
Next, I perform empirical analysis of repeat violations in California and find 
limited evidence of escalating penalties. I find that most facilities are compliant; 71.3% 
were compliant in at least eight out of the nine years I study. I also find no evidence that 
3 
penalties escalate. Somewhat surprisingly, facilities that were in violation for longer 
periods of time were assessed smaller penalties on average per year of violation. I argue 
that this is because repeat violations are less severe, and thus do not merit large penalties. 
Therefore, even though penalties do not escalate, persistent violators might not be “bad 
apples” as their violations are less serious. 
Thus, my dissertation examines the impact of monitoring and enforcement policy 
and shows that penalties are effective at reducing emissions and improving air quality. 
This is a relatively new finding; very little of the previous literature on monitoring and 
enforcement has found that penalties are effective at improving environmental 
performance. My dissertation shows that penalties are effective as a part of an aggressive 
air pollution regulation regime like California’s.  
4 
CHAPTER I 
EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT ON 
STATIONARY SOURCE EMISSIONS 
Introduction 
Public monitoring and enforcement are an important part of any regulatory 
regime. This is especially true for environmental regulations as environmental harms can 
be complex and widespread and private parties are often ill equipped to perform 
monitoring and enforcement. At the same time, monitoring and enforcement actions are 
costly, and, in order to justify the cost, they should produce environmental benefit. This 
chapter investigates how monitoring and enforcement actions affect stationary source 
emissions, focusing on emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), an important air pollutant that 
is responsible for major air quality problems but has not been studied. This chapter is the 
first research that examines how monitoring and enforcement affect criteria pollutant 
emissions, and I find that penalties decrease emissions.  
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identified ozone and fine 
particles as the pollutants that cause the most significant human health effects (EPA 
2011a). Ozone and fine particles are two of six “criteria pollutants,” commonly found air 
pollutants that affect human health and the environment, for which the EPA has set 
national air quality standards. Ozone is not emitted directly, but is created by chemical 
reactions between NOx and volatile organic compounds. There are two types of 
particulate matter: particulate matter with a diameter of 10 micrometers or less (PM10) 
and particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5 micrometers or less (PM2.5). PM2.5, also 
5 
known as fine particles, may be emitted directly but is mostly formed by reactions 
between other air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and NOx. Because NOx is a precursor 
of both ozone and fine particles, it is an important pollutant on which regulators focus.  
As criteria pollutants are ubiquitous, it is crucial to establish the impact that 
monitoring and enforcement have on criteria pollutant emissions. Unfortunately, due to 
the limited availability of data,
1
 the literature has not done so. Articles that studied the 
effect of regulatory actions on air pollution have focused on compliance and not 
emissions (e.g., Gray and Deily 1996; Nadeau 1997; Deily and Gray 2007); those that 
studied emissions examined toxic chemicals covered by the Toxics Release Inventory
2
 
(TRI) (Hanna and Oliva 2010).
3
 However, the TRI does not cover NOx and other criteria 
pollutants, and researchers have not examined emissions of criteria pollutants. This 
chapter is the first to study the impact of monitoring and enforcement on emissions of 
criteria pollutants. 
Some of the earliest work on monitoring and enforcement focused on the impact 
of monitoring and enforcement on oil spills. For instance, Epple and Visscher (1984) 
found that increasing monitoring activity reduced the amount of oil spilled, and Cohen 
(1987) found that certain types of monitoring activity were more effective than others. 
Researchers also found mixed evidence on the effectiveness of penalties. For example, 
Viladrich Grau and Groves (1997) found that enforcement reduced the probability of oil 
spills as well as the spill volume, but found that the size of the penalty had no significant 
                                                 
1
 Gray and Shimshack (2011) point out that while air pollution compliance is observable to researchers, 
emissions are not.  
2
 The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act requires manufacturing plants to report 
releases of certain toxic chemicals. These releases are reported to a database known as the Toxics Release 
Inventory.  
3
 On the other hand, researchers studying the impact of monitoring and enforcement on water pollution 
have examined both compliance and effluent (e.g., Magat and Viscusi 1990). 
6 
impact. On the other hand, Weber and Crew (2000) found that the size and swiftness of 
the penalty reduced the size of oil spills, but the certainty of the penalty did not. 
Other studies have explored the relationship between regulatory actions and a 
facility’s compliance and pollution releases for both air and water pollution.4 Water 
pollution studies generally investigated the relationship between regulatory action and 
effluent and compliance. For example, Magat and Viscusi (1990) measured the effect of 
inspections of pulp and paper plants on the plant’s compliance with the Clean Water Act 
and found that inspections in the previous quarter increased compliance and decreased 
effluent. Laplante and Rilstone (1996) performed a similar study on water pollution at 
pulp and paper plants in Quebec and found that current and previous inspections lowered 
absolute discharges and discharges relative to the norm, and that the predicted probability 
of inspection produced larger reductions than actual inspections. On the other hand, 
Earnhart (2004a, b) studied municipal wastewater plants in Kansas and found that actual 
inspections and enforcement actions reduced effluent but predicted inspections and 
enforcement actions had no significant impact.  
Articles that investigated air pollution have studied the impact of monitoring and 
enforcement on whether a facility complies with its permit limits, the duration a facility 
remains noncompliant, and emissions.
5
 Gray and Deily (1996) used both lagged and 
predicted inspections and enforcement actions in their study of Clean Air Act (CAA) 
compliance at steel-making plants. They found that the predicted number of inspections 
and enforcement actions had no effect on compliance, but actual inspections and 
                                                 
4
 For the purposes of this chapter I refer to water pollution releases as effluent and air pollution releases as 
emissions. 
5
 Keohane, Mansur, and Voynov (2009) studied the impact of impending litigation on emissions at power 
plants and found that litigation reduced emissions. As this chapter focuses on aspects of regulation other 
than litigation, I do not discuss this study in depth.  
7 
enforcement actions increased compliance. In a later paper (Deily and Gray 2007), their 
investigation of the joint effect of environmental regulations and health and safety 
regulations yielded similar results.  
Nadeau (1997) studied how the number of inspections and enforcement actions 
affected the duration a facility remained out of compliance. He found that predicted 
monitoring and enforcement actions, when predictions were based on the noncompliant 
sample, significantly reduced the duration a facility remained noncompliant. 
Lastly, Hanna and Oliva (2010) studied emissions of toxic chemicals covered by 
the TRI at manufacturing plants between 1985 and 2001. They found that actual CAA 
inspections decreased emissions of toxic chemicals but the probability of inspection had 
no significant effect. They also found that fines seemingly increased emissions; however, 
they argued that industries with high abatement costs preferred fines to abatement, thus 
producing this counterintuitive result.  
In this chapter, I use a dataset of stationary source emissions in California to 
examine the impact of monitoring and enforcement on NOx emissions. I find that 
penalties produced significant reductions in NOx emissions. A majority of the surveyed 
literature studied water pollution; of the articles that studied the effect of regulatory 
actions on air pollution, only one examined emissions—Hanna and Oliva (2010) studied 
toxic emissions at manufacturing facilities in the United States. This chapter extends the 
literature by examining NOx, an important pollutant that has not been studied because of 
the lack of data. Furthermore, limiting the sample to one jurisdiction, California, reduces 
the heterogeneity in regulatory policy and allows me to better understand state and local 
8 
regulatory policy. This is especially important because state and local regulators play a 
major role in the implementation of the CAA. 
Regulatory Background 
The CAA is a comprehensive national air pollution control program that regulates 
nation-wide air quality. Under § 109 of the CAA, the EPA establishes national ambient 
air quality standards (NAAQS) for six commonly found pollutants that harm health and 
the environment. These pollutants, also called criteria pollutants, are ozone, particulate 
matter, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and lead. Although the 
NAAQS are federal standards, states have primary responsibility for achieving and 
maintaining these standards. Sources located in areas that are in NAAQS nonattainment 
face more stringent regulations, such as lower emissions limits, that aim to bring the area 
into attainment.  
In California, stationary source monitoring and enforcement are handled primarily 
by thirty-five local air districts, not by the EPA.
6
 Monitoring and enforcement practices 
depend on the type of source: major sources are sources that emit (or have the potential to 
emit) more than 100 tons per year of any pollutant and synthetic minor sources are 
sources that emit (or have the potential to emit) above 80% of the major source threshold 
(EPA 2001). Minor sources are sources whose potential uncontrolled emissions are below 
100 tons per year. In my analysis, I focus on inspections, enforcement actions, and 
penalties. There are two types of inspections, full compliance evaluations (FCEs) and 
                                                 
6
 Local air districts are responsible for almost 99% of the regulatory actions in my data, so my discussion 
focuses on air district policy and practice, not EPA policy and practice. I base this description of air district 
policy on discussions with staff at the four largest air districts, which constitute 80% of my sample. 
9 
partial compliance evaluations (PCEs), and three types of enforcement actions, notices of 
violation (NOVs), administrative orders, and consent decrees. Administrative orders are 
usually accompanied by penalties. 
An FCE is a comprehensive evaluation of the facility, addressing all regulated 
pollutants and emission units, and a PCE focuses on a subset of pollutants, requirements, 
or emission units and can be used to address particular areas of concern at a facility (EPA 
2001). Air districts typically perform an FCE once every two years for major sources and 
once every five years for synthetic minor sources. Districts typically perform other 
smaller inspections, PCEs, when there are complaints, ongoing violations, or reports of 
equipment breakdown. All districts report FCEs to the EPA’s data system.7 Most districts 
do not report PCEs, but some districts report some or all of their PCEs.
8
 For districts that 
do not report PCEs, I enter zero PCEs. In my analysis, I consider both FCEs and PCEs as 
inspections. 
There are three types of enforcement actions: NOVs, administrative orders, and 
consent decrees.
9
 The enforcement process begins with the discovery of a violation; 
inspectors can discover a violation through self-reporting, record review, or inspections. 
Upon discovering a violation, inspectors typically issue an NOV. A facility with multiple 
violations might receive one NOV for all the violations or one NOV for each violation; 
there is no fixed practice regarding the number of NOVs. The time between detecting a 
violation and issuing an NOV can vary. An NOV can be issued the same day, but it may 
take several weeks for more involved violations, such as violations that require review of 
                                                 
7
 Although air districts may perform FCEs via a series of PCEs, they report the underlying FCEs, not the 
individual PCEs. 
8
 The San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District reports some of its PCEs, and the South Coast Air 
Quality Management District reports all of its PCEs. 
9
 I based this classification on the EPA’s classification (EPA 2011b, 2012b). 
10 
the facility’s records. District regulators place an emphasis on correcting violations; once 
detected, violations are usually remedied quickly, sometimes the same day. NOVs 
usually expose the facility to penalties.  
After receiving an NOV, facilities typically resolve the matter administratively, 
and the district assesses a penalty and issues an administrative order. An administrative 
order might deal with multiple violations or multiple NOVs. The time between an NOV 
and an administrative order varies, but it mostly takes less than nine months.  
It is worth noting that, in California, NOVs typically expose the facility to 
penalties and almost all NOVs end up as administrative orders.
10
 An NOV notes a 
violation that is later addressed by an administrative order. However, because an 
administrative order can address multiple violations or multiple NOVs, there might not 
be a one-to-one relationship. Furthermore, most violations are corrected early in the 
process, before the penalty is assessed. Facilities rarely, if ever, refuse to correct a 
violation.  
Administrative orders may include other requirements. For instance, an 
administrative order could include a shutdown order, which requires the facility to stop 
operating the particular piece of equipment, or it could include a variance, which loosens 
the facility’s permit restrictions. Obviously, the shutdown order is far more costly than 
the variance, and this aspect of the enforcement process is important. However, I do not 
have any of these details about the administrative orders. Figure 1 shows the timeline of a 
typical violation. 
Some cases might go through the judicial process instead of the administrative 
process, which can take three to five years and usually ends in a consent decree. 
                                                 
10
 This is different from other jurisdictions where only some of the NOVs expose the facility to penalties. 
11 
However, this is rare; almost all cases go through the administrative process.
11
 Districts 
also vary in their reporting practices; all districts report violations that are considered 
high-priority violations,
12
 but some districts report some or all violations that are not 
considered high-priority violations.
13
 In my analysis, I collapse NOVs, administrative 
orders, and consent decrees into one enforcement actions variable. 
Theoretical Model 
I assume that the facility is run by a profit-maximizing, price-taking firm, and the 
only violation is a breakdown of abatement equipment. The firm chooses the quantity 
produced,  , and the amount spent maintaining abatement equipment,  , to maximize 
expected profits. The firm’s variable costs are determined by the cost function     . As 
quantity increases, cost increases at an increasing rate; that is,         and        , 
where    and    are the first and second derivatives of   respectively. The probability of 
breakdown of abatement equipment is determined by the function     , where the 
probability is between zero and one,          . As abatement expense increases, the 
probability of breakdown decreases at a decreasing rate; that is,         and       
 . If there is a breakdown, the violation is detected with probability  , and the firm faces 
a fine   if detected. Thus, the firm’s expected profit is given by  
                                                 
11
 Only 1.1% of the enforcement actions in my data are consent decrees.  
12
 High-priority violations are violations that the EPA believes should receive the “highest scrutiny and 
oversight” (EPA 1998, p. 3). These include more serious permit, emissions, and testing violations, and 
chronic violations. All districts report high-priority violations; the San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control 
District reports some of its violations that are not considered high-priority violations, and the South Coast 
Air Quality Management District reports all of its violations regardless of whether they are considered 
high-priority violations.  
13
 Regulatory authorities also have other types of enforcement actions at their disposal, such as notices to 
comply. However, as these are not reported to the EPA database, I do not discuss them.  
12 
                     , (1) 
where   is the expected profit and   is the price of the firm’s output. Taking the 
derivative with respect to quantity gives equilibrium quantity  
     
     , (2) 
where   
   is the inverse of   . Because      increases at an increasing rate (    ),    is 
a monotone increasing function and so   
   is also a monotone increasing function. 
Therefore, as   increases,    also increases; quantity produced increases as price 
increases. Similarly, taking the derivative of   with respect to   gives equilibrium 
abatement expense 
     
    
 
   
 . (3) 
Because      decreases at a decreasing rate (    ),    is a monotone increasing 
function and so   
   is also a monotone increasing function. Therefore, as   and   
increase,    also increases; abatement expense increases as the probability of detection 
increases and the size of the fine increases. For notational convenience let      
      
      and      
  ( 
 
   
)         . Thus far, I have established that   
      , 
  
        , and   
        , where   
  and   
  are the partial derivatives of         
with respect to   and  , respectively. 
Next, assume that if abatement equipment breaks down, emissions are equal to the 
quantity produced,    . If abatement equipment is working, emissions are reduced to a 
fraction of uncontrolled emissions,      , where         . Thus, expected 
emissions are     (         ). Substituting    and    in, expected emissions 
are 
13 
          (       )          . (4) 
The chain rule implies that         
 . Thus, the partial derivative of   with 
respect to   is 
     
             . (5) 
As previously established,    ,      ,    , and   
   ; thus     . This 
means that as prices increase, emissions increase. Similarly,            
  and 
           
 . Thus, 
    
             
  and (6) 
    
             
 . (7) 
As previously established,     ,      ,     ,     , and     ; therefore, 
     and     . This means that emissions decrease as the probability of detection 
increases, and emissions decrease as the size of the fine increases.  
Thus, more inspections, which increase the probability of detection,  , should 
decrease emissions. An increase in penalties, which increases  , should also decrease 
emissions. Enforcement actions can affect both probability of detection   and fines  . An 
increase in the number of enforcement actions might reflect an increase in detection of 
violations,  ; at the same time, repeat offenders might also face larger fines, thus an 
enforcement action might reflect an increase in  . Therefore, enforcement actions should 
decrease emissions.  
14 
Data Description 
I obtain emissions data from the California Air Resources Board’s (CARB) 
emissions inventory and monitoring and enforcement data from the EPA’s Air Facility 
System (AFS) database. While I do not restrict my sample to specific industries like other 
articles do, potentially introducing heterogeneity among the sources, studying only 
California limits heterogeneity in monitoring and enforcement policy. This also allows 
me to get a better understanding of state and local regulatory policy. 
CARB’s emissions inventory contains information about facilities regulated by 
California, including facility name, address, city, county, and air district responsible for 
its regulation, as well as amount of emissions the facility produced in that year. Every 
year, each facility’s emissions are estimated by the air district based on information 
submitted by the facility, such as fuel usage, and other information about the facility, 
such as equipment and abatement technology. Air districts compile this information for 
all facilities that emit over ten tons of pollutants per year.  
Emissions data are available between 1995 and 2008. However, I limit my period 
of study to 2002-2008 because compliance monitoring policy and data reporting practices 
changed significantly in 2001.
14
 I also dropped the facilities that produced no NOx over 
the entire period—all the facilities in my sample had positive emissions in at least one 
year. The mean facility NOx emissions, by year, are presented in Table 1. NOx decreases 
steadily from a mean of 79.7 tons per year in 2003 to 64.0 tons per year in 2008. The 
overall mean NOx emissions per facility per year, across the entire time period, is 73.0 
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 The EPA adopted a new Compliance Monitoring Strategy in October of 2001 (EPA 2001). This 
introduced new types of regulatory actions and changed the recommended inspection frequency. 
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tons. I also calculated each facility’s mean over the entire time period. There are 857 
facilities; the facility with the lowest NOx emissions over the entire period emitted just 
0.0002 tons per year, while the facility with the highest NOx emissions over the period 
emitted 4,853 tons per year. 
I restricted the sample to facilities that existed during the entire study period. 
Despite that, there are missing values. Even though there are 857 facilities, which should 
generate 5,142 observations, there are only 4,702 observations because of missing values. 
The number of missing values decreases steadily between 2003 and 2008.  
Different factors could have caused the missing values, and each reason implies a 
different method of overcoming the problem. First, the facility might have shut down 
permanently or new facilities might have begun operation; I control that by limiting the 
sample to facilities that existed through the entire period. Second, the facility might have 
failed to submit information due to reasons unrelated to emissions or regulatory actions. 
In this case, missing values will not bias the results. Third, the facility might have shut 
down temporarily due to factors such as a short-term decline in demand; in this case, 
these missing values should be treated as zero tons of emissions. Air districts usually fill 
in zero if this is the case, but it is still possible that such observations slip through as 
missing values.  
Fourth, the facility might have failed to submit emissions information due to 
reasons related to emissions or monitoring and enforcement actions. For example, 
facilities might choose not to submit information if emissions are unusually high, or a 
high number of regulatory actions at the facility might burden the facility’s 
environmental staff with other responsibilities and cause them to fail to submit the 
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information. Regulators indicated that they did not think that facilities were trying to hide 
high emissions levels by not submitting the required information. Because I am unable to 
discern the reason for the missing values, I treat the missing values as randomly missing 
values. Thus, I do not perform any corrections to compensate for missing values. As a 
precaution, I also run additional regression equations on the subsample of facilities that 
have no missing NOx values. 
The AFS is the EPA’s database for CAA-regulated sources. The database contains 
details of each polluting facility, such as its geographic coordinates, address, program 
identification number, and permit type. Additionally, it has details of regulatory actions 
since 2002: the date and type of regulatory action as well as the penalty. I classify all 
state and federal FCEs and PCEs as inspections, and all state and federal NOVs, 
administrative orders, and consent decrees as enforcement actions. Table 2 shows a 
summary of the number of inspections and enforcement actions and total penalty per 
facility-year.  
There is a mean of 1.93 inspections per facility-year, and 73.6% of the facilities-
years receive at least one inspection. The mean number of enforcement actions is 0.76 
and 23.6% of the facility-years receive at least one enforcement action. The mean penalty 
per facility-year is $12,994. However, only 17.2% of the facility-years have any 
penalties. Conditional upon a penalty, the mean is $75,564.
15
 As most penalties are small 
but there are several very large penalties, my regressions use the natural logarithm of 
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 The AFS has information on the compliance status of the facility; many studies have used compliance 
status as the dependent variable. However, the EPA cautions that compliance status is subject to errors of 
omission (EPA 2012a). Facility noncompliance in the AFS is a flag that regulators have to flip on or off 
when a facility becomes noncompliant or comes back into compliance. As it is located in a different part of 
the data system, regulators often overlook entering this data. In my sample, the average compliance rate is 
97.5%. Facilities that have received any sort of enforcement action in the current or previous year—and 
thus should be considered noncompliant—have a compliance rate of 94.3%. This indicates a high level of 
inaccuracy. As this chapter focuses on emissions, I do not investigate compliance further. 
17 
penalties. I add one to all penalties before taking the natural logarithm as there are many 
zero values. The mean of the logarithm of penalties is 1.47. 
Note that the data only show whether the facility received an enforcement action; 
they do not specify which pollutant the enforcement action concerns. Thus, I cannot tell if 
the facility violated a NOx emissions limit or some other permit condition. Additionally, 
while some of the water pollution literature used information on individual effluent pipes 
within the facility, my data treat the facility as the unit of observation, and I do not have 
information on individual smokestacks within a facility. Lastly, while one firm may own 
many facilities, the data are at the facility level, so I study the facility as the unit of 
observation, not the firm. 
Table 3 shows the correlations between current- and previous-year regulatory 
actions. Part A of the table shows the correlations between the number of actions and 
logarithm of the penalty, while part B shows the correlations between the dummy 
variables for whether the facility received the specific regulatory action or penalty. The 
number of inspections is weakly correlated with other regulatory actions and their lagged 
values, probably because most inspections are performed at a predetermined frequency. It 
is also worth noting that enforcement actions are highly correlated with penalties because 
most violations expose the facility to penalties.  
I merge AFS inspection and enforcement information with CARB emissions 
information based on facility name and address. I manage to match about two-thirds of 
the AFS facilities to their emissions. As AFS removes facilities that have shut down, I 
restrict the study to facilities that have been in the sample for the entire period, excluding 
those that were in existence during the start of the period but shut down during the period 
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and those facilities that began operating during the period.
16
 Whether this biases the 
results depends on why the facilities shut down or begin operating during the period. If 
the facilities begin operation and shut down for reasons unrelated to regulatory actions 
and are affected by regulatory action in the same way that existing firms are, then this 
limitation of the sample should not bias results. If facilities shut down due to regulatory 
pressure, for instance, if large penalties render the facilities unprofitable, then the 
regulatory actions would have reduced emissions to zero; thus, in this case, my results 
would underestimate the impact of regulatory actions. New facilities that began operation 
during the study period might have better pollution abatement equipment. Thus, 
regulatory actions against these facilities might be less effective because they already 
have relatively advanced abatement equipment. In this case, my regression results would 
overestimate the impact of regulatory actions.
17
 
I also control for air quality, including variables for NAAQS attainment status, 
and demographic factors, including variables for per capita income, unemployment, and 
percent white at the county-year level. Being in a nonattainment area might increase 
regulatory activity at a facility but might also cause a facility to face other pressure from 
the community to control emissions. Thus, I include NAAQS attainment status, from the 
EPA’s Green Book, to avoid omitted variables bias. I control for attainment status for 
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 I use compliance information to decide whether a facility was operating; I took its earliest compliance 
entry as the earliest date it was in operation. Additionally, through a Freedom of Information Act request, I 
obtained information regarding facilities that had shut down and were thus removed from the AFS. 
However these data were very difficult to match with the emissions inventory data. Thus, I did not pursue 
this.  
17
 Future iterations of this project can add facilities that have shut down (from the data I received through a 
Freedom of Information Act request) and facilities that began operation during the time period (which are 
already in the EPA database).   
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ozone, PM10, PM2.5, and carbon monoxide.
18
 I do not control for attainment status for 
nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and lead because all areas are in attainment of those 
standards. I get information about per capita income from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and include them in 
my regressions to control for price and cost of a facility’s output. I also obtain 
information about the percentage of white people in the county from the Census; counties 
with a large minority population might have less political power and less regulatory 
pressure to lower emissions, and omitting this might cause omitted variables bias.  
Table 4 presents a brief description and summary statistics for each variable. As 
the table shows, many facilities are situated in nonattainment counties. Sixty-seven 
percent of the facility-years are in PM10 nonattainment counties while 45.4% of the 
facilities-years are in PM2.5 nonattainment counties. Ninety-one percent of the facility-
years are in ozone nonattainment counties, while 31.3% of the facility-years are in carbon 
monoxide nonattainment counties. The average unemployment rate is 6.5%, average 
income is $37,191, and average percent of white population is 78.6%. 
Econometric Methods 
When investigating the impact of monitoring and enforcement on pollution, 
researchers have to overcome reverse causality. For instance, high emissions may attract 
regulatory action, leading to the mistaken conclusion that regulatory action causes 
noncompliance. Researchers have developed several methods of overcoming reverse 
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 Nonattainment classification for PM2.5 started only in 2005. All areas were classified as in attainment 
prior to 2005. In my regressions, year dummy variables account for this.   
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causality: including a wide range of control variables; limiting the analysis to facilities in 
one industry; and adjustments to the regulatory action explanatory variable.  
Most studies combat this problem by including a wide range of control variables, 
such as the facilities’ output and production process (e.g., Magat and Viscusi 1990). For 
example, if a facility’s output increases, it might increase emissions but also draw 
regulators’ attention. Including an extensive set of controls can alleviate such problems. I 
do not have detailed facility information, but I use facility fixed effects, control for 
income, unemployment rate, percent white, and NAAQS attainment status on the county-
year level, and control for time trends. 
Furthermore, most articles constrain analysis to facilities in one industry or 
several similar industries, such as pulp and paper mills, to ensure that the facilities 
studied are approximately similar and thus would react similarly to regulatory action. Not 
limiting the sample in this way can exacerbate causality problems. For example, Hanna 
and Oliva (2010) studied all manufacturing facilities and found that facilities that were 
fined did not reduce their emissions while facilities that were not fined reduced their 
emissions. They argued that this was due to the differences across industries; industries 
with high abatement costs preferred fines to emissions reduction. Thus, these facilities 
polluted more and also faced higher fines, causing the positive relationship between 
emissions and fines. Although I do not limit my sample to facilities in specific industries, 
I use fixed effects regression analysis. Fixed effects regression measures variation at a 
facility over time, so time-invariant characteristics, like the industry of the facility, will 
not cause the problem that Hanna and Oliva faced. I also ran additional regressions 
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limiting my sample to sources considered to be major sources and manufacturing 
facilities. 
Articles addressed reverse causality by making three different adjustments to the 
explanatory variables: using lagged regulatory variables, using the predicted probability 
of regulatory action, and using regulatory action directed at other facilities as an 
instrumental variable. Researchers most commonly compensate for reverse causality by 
regressing compliance or pollution releases in the current time period against monitoring 
and enforcement actions in previous time periods. Lagged variables avoid reverse 
causality because current noncompliance or pollution releases cannot cause inspections or 
enforcement actions in a preceding time period. For example, Magat and Viscusi (1990) 
found that previous-quarter inspections increased compliance and decreased effluent at 
pulp and paper plants.  
Other studies addressed the reverse causality problem by using the predicted 
probability of an inspection or enforcement action as explanatory variables, in addition to 
using lagged regulatory variables. Laplante and Rilstone (1996) studied water pollution at 
pulp and paper plants in Quebec and found that current and previous inspections lowered 
discharges and the fitted probability of inspections produced larger reductions than actual 
inspections. However, Earnhart (2004a, b) performed similar studies on publicly owned 
municipal wastewater plants in Kansas and found that actual inspections and enforcement 
actions reduced effluent but predicted inspections and enforcement actions did not reduce 
effluent, and even increased effluent in some cases. 
For air pollution studies, researchers have generally found that actual inspections 
and enforcement actions increased compliance or lowered emissions, but the predicted 
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probability of inspection and enforcement actions had no significant impact. Gray and 
Deily’s (1996) study of CAA compliance at steel-making plants found that the predicted 
number of inspections and enforcement actions had no effect on compliance, but if the 
plant had been inspected or faced an enforcement action in the past two years, it was 
more likely to be in compliance. Similarly, Hanna and Oliva (2010) studied emissions of 
toxic chemicals at manufacturing plants and found that actual CAA inspections decreased 
emissions of toxic chemicals but the probability of inspection had no significant effect.  
Lastly, researchers used instrumental variables to compensate for reverse 
causality. In their study of pulp and paper mills, Shimshack and Ward (2005) used the 
rate of inspection at other regulated plants in the same jurisdiction as an instrument for 
inspections at the facility. They reasoned that, as pulp and paper plants formed a very 
small portion of the regulator’s responsibilities, inspections at other regulated plants were 
unrelated to any idiosyncratic plant-specific effects. Thus, they argued, the variable 
reflected an overall rate of inspection and met the exclusion restriction. They found that a 
fine (both the presence and magnitude of the fine) in the previous year on any plant in the 
same jurisdiction increased compliance at that plant, as did a previous-year inspection on 
the plant. Current inspections, for which the authors used instrumental variables, had no 
significant impact. On the other hand, Earnhart (2004b), in his study of municipal 
wastewater treatment plants, used enforcement at all regulated plants in the jurisdiction as 
an explanatory variable (not an instrumental variable) and found that the general 
enforcement rate reduced effluent. 
The studies mentioned above generally found that actual inspections and 
enforcement actions improved compliance and decreased pollution released. However, 
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predicted inspections and enforcement actions seem to be ineffective: only one of the 
studies found that predicted inspections reduced effluent (Laplante and Rilstone 1996), 
and there is little evidence that predicted enforcement had any impact. This is, perhaps, 
because the predicted probability of regulatory action is a poor measure of the polluter’s 
perceived probability of regulatory action.  
In this chapter, I use the fixed effects regression model, which examines the 
changes in NOx at the same facility across time. This can reduce problems presented by 
differences in facilities across industries. I also use lagged regulatory variables to control 
for reverse causality. I describe my regression models in more detail in the next section.  
Regression Analysis 
In order to analyze the impact of monitoring and enforcement on emissions, I use 
a fixed effects regression model. The econometric model is represented by  
                      
      
               .
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 (8) 
Emissions for facility   at time   are represented by    . In this case, it measures the tons 
of NOx released in that year. Time-invariant facility characteristics, such as technology, 
industry, or location of the facility, are captured by   . Year dummy variables are 
represented by      , and capture general time trends in emissions. Other time-varying 
characteristics are captured by    ; this controls for demographic characteristics (income, 
unemployment rate, and percent white) and attainment status (for particulate matter, 
ozone, and carbon monoxide) of the county in which the facility is located. 
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 While some articles control for the lagged dependent variable       , controlling for it in this case would 
cause estimators to be inconsistent because fixed effects regressions are estimated by mean-differencing 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2010).  
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The variable                    represents regulatory action, such as 
inspections and enforcement actions taken or penalties assessed, which can be measured 
in two different ways. One option is to use the number of regulatory actions, such as the 
number of inspections or number of enforcement actions, taken in any given year, 
directly. This has the advantage of providing a more complete picture: if a facility is 
subject to more inspections, then it should show a larger effect on emissions than a 
facility that is subject to fewer inspections.  
The second option is to use dummy variables to indicate whether the facility has 
received a particular regulatory action. This would make sense if the presence of 
regulatory action, not the number of regulatory actions, is what drives any changes in 
emissions. Additionally, in my data, the number of regulatory actions might be driven 
primarily by the size of the facility, not the degree of regulatory scrutiny the facility is 
facing. Because I do not limit my data to facilities in specific industries, there is great 
variation in the size of the facilities and therefore great variation in the number of 
regulatory actions. For example, a large facility can receive multiple enforcement actions 
for multiple smokestacks but a small facility with only one smokestack is unlikely to 
receive multiple actions. Thus, the number of regulatory actions is perhaps more 
representative of the size of the facility than the degree of regulatory scrutiny the facility 
is facing; this would make dummy variables more appropriate.  
Furthermore, dummy variables can minimize problems in my data. For instance, 
the data show that many large facilities received multiple FCEs per year. This is likely a 
reporting error as inspectors state that it is highly unlikely that they could complete 




 The literature has taken both approaches, so I run the regression using both 
the number of actions and dummy variables. 
Additionally, the measure of regulatory action should account for reverse 
causality. As previously mentioned, using current regulatory action as the explanatory 
variable creates the risk of reverse causality. One solution is to use regulatory actions in 
the previous year instead of the current year,                       instead of 
                  . This avoids reverse causality because emissions this year cannot 
cause regulatory actions in the previous year. Thus, my regression equation is  
                         
      
               . (9) 
In the equation,                       is a vector of variables representing the number 
of regulatory actions in the previous year: inspections, enforcement actions, and penalties 
in the previous year. As the distribution of penalties is very skewed, I use the natural 
logarithm of penalties instead of the amount of penalties. As discussed in the theoretical 
model, increasing the probability of detecting a violation and increasing the size of 
penalties should decrease emissions. Thus, I expect the coefficients of inspections, 
enforcement actions, and penalties to be negative.  
In regression (1) of Table 5, I present the effect of having at least one previous-
year inspection, at least one previous-year enforcement action, and a positive previous-
year penalty on emissions. The coefficient of penalties is negative and significant at the 
10% level. If a facility received a penalty in the previous year, its NOx emissions 
decrease by 5.60 tons on average, which is about 7.7% of the mean emissions of 72.98 
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 Such recording mistakes could happen if, for instance, a facility is inspected once for two different air 
programs, hazardous air pollutants and criteria pollutants. Although it is only one action, it might be 
recorded twice because it involved two air programs. The AFS tries to minimize such mistakes but they 
still occur. 
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tons. Surprisingly, enforcement actions have no significant impact on emissions. This is 
probably because enforcement actions are often accompanied by penalties; thus, 
enforcement actions alone have no significant impact as penalties capture the deterrent 
effect of the enforcement action. 
In the regression, inspections do not affect emissions. This is probably because 
there is not much variation within the facility. Fixed effects regression tracks each facility 
over time; for an inspection to produce a significant impact on pollution, the inspection 
rate at a facility must change over time. Most air districts perform inspections at the same 
frequency through the study period, once every two years for major sources and once 
every five years for synthetic minor sources, so there is not much within-facility 
variation. Furthermore, the inspection rate is high, with 73.6% of facility-years receiving 
at least one inspection, and a marginal increase in inspections might have no impact. 
Thus, these two factors might be responsible for the lack of significance of the coefficient 
of inspections. It is worth noting that other studies have found that inspections improved 
compliance and decreased pollution releases. For example, Hanna and Oliva (2010) 
found that inspections significantly reduced toxic emissions, but they had dropped 
facilities that face yearly inspections from their sample. Other studies (e.g., Gray and 
Deily 1996) also found that inspections improved compliance. My sample is more recent 
and focuses on California, which has an aggressive inspection regime; thus, it likely has 
less variation in inspection rates, causing the insignificant coefficients.  
In regressions (2), (3), and (4), of Table 5, I run the same regression with different 
samples. Regression (2) displays the regression results when I use only facilities that are 
considered major sources. The results are similar, and a penalty reduces emissions by 
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6.24 tons. Regression (3) displays the regression results when I use a balanced panel of 
facilities that have no missing NOx values. The coefficient of penalties remains negative 
and significant; receiving a penalty reduces NOx emissions by 6.68 tons. Lastly, 
regression (4) displays the regression results for facilities that are in the manufacturing 
industry (Standard Industrial Classification code 20-39). The coefficient of penalties 
remains negative and significant; receiving a penalty reduces emissions by 10.73 tons for 
manufacturing facilities.  
In Table 6, I present the results of regressions when I use the number of 
regulatory actions (the number of inspections, the number of enforcement actions, and the 
natural logarithm of total penalties) as the explanatory variable instead of dummy 
variables that indicate the presence of a regulatory action. The coefficient of penalties 
remains negative and statistically significant in most specifications. Regression (1) 
displays the effect of previous-year inspections, enforcement actions, and penalties on 
emissions for all facilities. The coefficient of penalties is negative and significant at the 
10% level; increasing the penalty by 1% decreases NOx emissions by 0.007 tons. 
Although this number is small, penalties are relatively large and can cause large 
reductions. For instance, increasing the penalty from $1 to the average of $12,994 
decreases emissions by 6.41 tons; increasing the penalty from the 25th percentile to the 
75th percentile of the distribution of positive penalties (an increase from $1,500 to 
$12,896), decreases emissions by 1.46 tons. A 1.46 ton reduction is approximately 2.0% 
of the mean emissions of 72.98 tons.  
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Regressions (2) to (4) display the regression results when I use different samples. 
The results are similar; the coefficient of penalties remains negative and significant for all 
the samples except the balanced panel.  
Robustness Tests 
Next, I examine whether the fixed effects results in Table 5 and Table 6 are 
robust. First, I examine whether omitting year dummy variables and fixed effects affects 
the results. Table 7 shows the coefficients of the regulatory action variables when I omit 
year dummy variables. Regressions (1) to (4) are very similar to the analogous 
regressions in Table 5 and regressions (5) to (8) are very similar to the analogous 
regressions in Table 6. Thus, the results are robust to omitting time trends.  
Additionally, I examine how using pooled ordinary least squares, which omits 
facility fixed effects, affects the result. I run the regression 
                         
      
              . (10) 
where, instead of facility fixed effects,    in equation (9), there is a common intercept 
term,  . Table 8 shows the results: inspections and enforcement actions seem to increase 
emissions. This is likely due to the fact that regulators focus their regulatory actions on 
facilities that produce more emissions. Using fixed effects mitigates this reverse causality 
problem. Table 9 shows that the results are similar if I omit both fixed effects and time 
trends.  
Next, I examine whether omitting various control variables affects the results. 
Table 10 displays the coefficients of regulatory actions when I run a fixed effects 
regression on all facilities but omit various control variables. Regressions (1) to (3) are 
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similar to regression (1) in Table 5, examining how the presence of regulatory actions 
affects NOx emissions, and regressions (4) to (6) are similar to regression (1) in Table 6, 
examining how the number of regulatory actions affects NOx emissions. Omitting various 
control variables does not affect the significance and magnitude of the results. For 
example, as regression (1) of Table 10 shows, if I omit the NAAQS nonattainment 
variables from the regression, the coefficient of penalties is still significant and similar in 
magnitude, -5.70. As the table shows, the results are robust to omitting various control 
variables. In Appendix A, I present the regression results for the other subsamples, major 
facilities, the balanced panel, and manufacturing facilities, as well as further robustness 
tests. 
Conclusion  
This chapter is one of the few studies to directly examine air pollution emissions, 
and the first to examine the effect of monitoring and enforcement on NOx and criteria 
pollutant emissions. Furthermore, by limiting my study to one jurisdiction, I am able to 
better understand the monitoring and enforcement policies of the regulator; this is 
important because state and local regulators play a big role in the CAA.  
Penalties have the most robust effect; having a positive penalty reduces emissions 
by an average of 5.60 tons and increasing the penalty from the 25th percentile to the 75th 
percentile of the penalty distribution reduces emissions by 1.46 tons. The coefficients of 
inspections and enforcement actions are not significant, perhaps indicating that the 
deterrent impact of the regulatory regime lies in the penalties. Previous work has found 
that inspections and enforcement actions improved pollution outcomes. On the other 
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hand, little work has found penalties to be effective, with the exception of Shimshack and 
Ward’s (2005) finding that penalties on other facilities in the same jurisdiction improve 
compliance and Weber and Crew’s (2000) finding that larger penalties reduce the size of 
oil spills.  
My result, that penalties are effective, might be due to California’s uniquely 
aggressive pollution control regime and the certainty with which a violation results in a 
penalty. First, the inspection rate in California is very high; the inspection rate for all 
states other than California was 24.5%, far less than the inspection rate of 73.6% in my 
sample. Thus, it is more likely that violations will be detected and result in a penalty. 
Second, in California, almost every violation exposes the facility to a penalty, even if the 
violation is fixed quickly. Thus, given the relative certainty of penalties, it is unsurprising 
that penalties are effective at improving facility behavior. 
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Table 1. Mean Facility NOx Emissions in Tons 
Year Obs. Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. 
2003 756 79.650 (336.332) 0 4,813.100 
2004 762 76.830 (315.653) 0 4,483.260 
2005 770 77.500 (321.292) 0 4,753.500 
2006 808 71.932 (309.097) 0 4,753.500 
2007 807 68.753 (308.542) 0 5,265.266 
2008 799 63.990 (280.459) 0 5,108.270 
Overall 4,702 72.984 (311.910) 0 5,265.266 
Facility mean 857 68.477 (295.051) 0.0002
 
4,852.883 




Table 2. Means for Inspections, Enforcement Actions, and Penalty Amount per Facility-
Year 
 Mean (Std. dev.) Proportion positive 
Inspections 1.932 (3.003) 0.736 
Enforcement actions 0.755 (2.853) 0.236 
Penalty 12,993.61 (190,945.97) 0.172 
Penalty (log) 1.468 (3.309) 0.172 
Given penalty > 0    
  Penalty 75,563.84 (455,542.62)  
  Penalty (log) 8.536 (1.820)  
Source: Author’s calculations and EPA Air Facility System, 2002-2008. 
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Table 3. Correlations Between Current- and Previous-Year Regulatory Actions at a 
Facility 
  
Inspections Enforcement actions Penalty (log) 
A. Number of regulatory actions   
Current year actions:  





Enforcement actions 0.200 1.000 
 
 
Penalty (log) 0.171 0.517 1.000 
Previous year actions: 
   
 
Inspections 0.714 0.132 0.140 
 
Enforcement actions 0.245 0.516 0.311 
 
Penalty (log) 0.146 0.212 0.230 
B. Dummy variable for regulatory actions   
Current year actions: 





Enforcement actions 0.111 1.000 
 
 
Positive penalty 0.080 0.819 1.000 
Previous year actions 
   
 
Inspections 0.208 0.058 0.051 
 
Enforcement actions 0.076 0.380 0.380 
 
Positive penalty 0.081 0.199 0.200 
Source: Author’s calculations and EPA Air Facility System, 2002-2008. 
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Table 4. Description and Mean (per Facility-Year) of Variables  
 Variable Description Mean (Std. dev.) 
Dependent variable   
 NOx  NOx emissions in tons. Source: CARB. 72.984 (311.910) 
Explanatory variables   
 Inspections Number of full and partial compliance 
evaluations performed. FCEs address all 
pollutants and emission units and are 
performed once every two years for major 
facilities and once every five years for 
synthetic minor facilities. PCEs focus on a 
subset of pollutants or emission units, and 
are usually performed in response to 





Number of notices of violation, 
administrative orders, and consent decrees 
issued. NOVs are issued within a month of 
discovering the violation and 
administrative orders address a violation 
and usually take place within nine months 
of discovery. Source: EPA. 
0.755 (2.853) 
 Penalty Total penalty the facility received in the 
year, in thousands of dollars. Source: EPA. 
12.994  (190.946)  
 PM10 
nonattainment 
Indicator for whether the county was in 
attainment of PM10 NAAQS (1 = 
nonattainment). Source: EPA. 
0.674 (0.469) 
 PM2.5  
nonattainment 
Indicator for whether the county was in 
attainment of PM2.5 NAAQS (1 = 




Indicator for whether the county was in 
attainment of ozone NAAQS (1 = 





Indicator for whether the county was in 
attainment of carbon monoxide NAAQS 




Percentage unemployment rate in the 
county. Source: BLS. 
6.521 (2.105) 
 Income Per capita income in the county, in 
thousands of dollars. Source: BEA. 
37.191 (9.936) 
 Percent white Percent white population in the county. 
Source: Census. 
78.581 (7.660) 
Source: Author’s calculations, California Air Resources Board (CARB) emissions 
inventory, EPA Air Facility System, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA), and U.S. Census. 
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Table 5. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Impact of the Presence of Regulatory Actions 
in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions 
Sample
a
 All Major Balanced Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Presence of any inspections 
in the previous year 
-0.497 0.735 -0.843 0.827 
(1.769) (2.770) (2.036) (3.612) 
Presence of any enforcement 
actions in the previous year 
2.289 2.451 3.030 5.208 
(2.572) (2.969) (2.790) (4.237) 









(3.215) (3.690) (3.507) (5.246) 
PM10 nonattainment -2.469 -2.896 -2.836 -6.267 
(3.504) (4.347) (3.778) (7.367) 
PM2.5 nonattainment 0.220 0.342 0.169 1.459 
(1.057) (1.512) (1.160) (2.418) 
Ozone nonattainment -6.080
+
 -7.464 -5.950 -7.035 
(3.589) (5.091) (3.897) (6.762) 
Carbon monoxide 
nonattainment 
-3.152 2.263 -0.750 -8.443 
(7.480) (11.800) (8.904) (15.680) 
Unemployment rate -2.224 -3.046 -2.139 2.498 
(4.219) (5.603) (4.531) (6.213) 
Income (/$1000) 7.794
+
 10.758* 8.525* 16.957* 
(4.043) (5.444) (4.276) (6.709) 
Percent white -5.117 -7.980 -4.097 -7.025 
(4.137) (5.450) (4.630) (7.315) 
Observations 4,702 3,459 4,032 2,316 
Facilities 857 613 672 423 
Adjusted R-squared 0.961 0.960 0.962 0.966 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; year 
dummy variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“all,” “major,” “balanced,” and “manufacturing”) refer to the sample 
used in the regression. 
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Table 6. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Impact of the Number of Regulatory Actions in 
the Previous Year on NOx Emissions 
Sample
a
 All Major Balanced Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of inspections in 
the previous year 
-1.115 -1.080 -0.869 0.042 
(0.758) (0.892) (1.007) (1.109) 
Number of enforcement 
actions in the previous year 
0.960 0.974 0.320 1.208 
(1.083) (1.097) (1.235) (1.535) 
Amount of penalty (log) in 








(0.390) (0.434) (0.450) (0.570) 
PM10 nonattainment -2.671 -3.325 -3.019 -6.003 
(3.410) (4.279) (3.685) (7.048) 
PM2.5 nonattainment -0.020 -0.018 0.011 1.462 
(1.083) (1.575) (1.198) (2.535) 
Ozone nonattainment -5.603 -6.922 -5.678 -6.573 
(3.605) (5.121) (3.959) (6.821) 
Carbon monoxide 
nonattainment 
-3.319 1.820 -0.740 -8.178 
(7.329) (11.707) (8.785) (15.281) 
Unemployment rate -2.290 -2.936 -2.327 2.752 








(4.183) (5.594) (4.463) (6.673) 
Percent white -4.189 -6.839 -3.441 -7.083 
(3.991) (5.196) (4.495) (6.886) 
Observations 4,702 3,459 4,032 2,316 
Facilities 857 613 672 423 
Adjusted R-squared 0.961 0.961 0.962 0.966 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; year 
dummy variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“all,” “major,” “balanced,” and “manufacturing”) refer to the sample 














Table 7. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Impact of Regulatory Actions in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions, Without Time Trends 
Regulatory actions
a
 Presence of Regulatory Actions Number of Regulatory Action 
Sample
b
 All Major Balanced Manufacturing All Major Balanced Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Inspections in the 
previous year 
-0.593 0.332 -1.131 0.258 -1.298* -1.360* -1.100 -0.372 
(1.622) (2.521) (1.857) (3.270) (0.705) (0.795) (0.911) (0.987) 
Enforcement actions 
in the previous year 
2.576 2.845 3.288 5.970 0.979 1.005 0.340 1.263 
(2.629) (3.044) (2.849) (4.459) (1.086) (1.100) (1.235) (1.534) 
Penalty in the 
previous year (log) 
-5.808* -6.466* -6.942* -11.300** -0.681* -0.748* -0.590 -1.059* 
(3.341) (3.808) (3.635) (5.552) (0.396) (0.438) (0.455) (0.571) 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; NAAQS nonattainment and demographic variables 
included but not shown. 
a
 Headings refer to the type of explanatory variable used in the regression. 
b













Table 8. Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of the Impact of Regulatory Actions in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions, 
Without Fixed Effects  
Regulatory actions
a
 Presence of Regulatory Actions Number of Regulatory Action 
Sample
b
 All Major Balanced Manufacturing All Major Balanced Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




 50.502 4.920 2.657 8.383
+
 6.389 
(14.190) (22.356) (15.629) (32.419) (3.288) (3.407) (4.489) (7.039) 
Enforcement actions 
in the previous year 
55.209* 49.225 60.055* 83.371
+
 16.327** 15.935* 25.297** 21.610** 
(24.893) (30.227) (27.583) (42.734) (6.237) (6.303) (7.669) (8.111) 
Penalty in the 
previous year (log) 
25.583 28.591 25.997 60.643
+
 3.973 4.036 1.539 9.157 
(19.634) (22.309) (21.851) (33.397) (3.648) (4.213) (3.868) (5.811) 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; NAAQS nonattainment, demographic variables, and 
year dummy variables included but not shown. 
a
 Headings refer to the type of explanatory variable used in the regression. 
b













Table 9. Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of the Impact of Regulatory Actions in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions, Without 
Fixed Effects and Time Trends 
Regulatory actions
a
 Presence of Regulatory Actions Number of Regulatory Action 
Sample
b
 All Major Balanced Manufacturing All Major Balanced Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




 48.968 5.135 2.848 8.611
+
 6.772 
(13.767) (20.740) (15.078) (31.538) (3.377) (3.474) (4.568) (7.251) 
Enforcement actions 
in the previous year 
54.534* 48.411 59.116* 82.125
+
 16.169** 15.738* 25.125** 21.301** 
(24.696) (29.507) (27.310) (42.111) (6.231) (6.286) (7.645) (8.073) 
Penalty in the 
previous year (log) 
25.148 28.380 25.683 60.835
+
 3.875 3.944 1.431 9.108 
(19.527) (22.179) (21.763) (33.158) (3.605) (4.130) (3.822) (5.773) 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; NAAQS nonattainment and demographic variables 
included but not shown. 
a
 Headings refer to the type of explanatory variable used in the regression. 
b












Table 10. Fixed Effects Regression of the Impact of Regulatory Actions in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions at All Facilities, 
Omitting Control Variables 
Regulatory actions
a
 Presence of Regulatory Actions Number of Regulatory Action 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inspections in the previous year -0.450 -0.549 -0.474 -1.148 -1.135 -1.159 
(1.644) (1.716) (1.564) (0.764) (0.739) (0.754) 
Enforcement actions in the 
previous year  
2.260 2.415 2.439 0.961 0.988 0.993 
(2.582) (2.625) (2.660) (1.083) (1.080) (1.079) 













(3.186) (3.249) (3.205) (0.389) (0.392) (0.390) 
NAAQS nonattainment (PM10, 
PM2.5, ozone, and CO) 
      
Demographic variables (income, 
unemployment, and percent white) 
      
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; NAAQS nonattainment and demographic 
variables are included in some specifications but not shown; year dummy variables included but not shown. 
a












order and penalty 
     




EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF MONITORING AND  
ENFORCEMENT ON AIR QUALITY 
Introduction 
The Clean Air Act (CAA) is a comprehensive air pollution control scheme, which 
includes nation-wide air quality standards, emissions limitations for polluting facilities, 
and monitoring and enforcement of permit limits, with the central purpose of promoting 
public health and welfare by enhancing air quality. Thus, any assessment of the 
monitoring and enforcement regime must examine its impact on air quality. In this 
chapter, I use a dataset of air quality measures in California to examine the impact of 
monitoring and enforcement on ambient ozone concentrations. My study focuses on 
California because its aggressive pollution control policies allow me to test the 
effectiveness of air pollution regulation. Additionally, focusing on one jurisdiction allows 
me to better understand its regulatory regime. I find that penalties improve air quality. 
Inspections and enforcement actions also improve air quality, but the effect is less robust. 
Under the CAA, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets national 
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for “criteria pollutants,” which are six commonly 
found air pollutants that affect human health and the environment. State and local 
regulators are responsible for attaining the NAAQS by monitoring and enforcing 
stationary source emissions permits. As air quality is the main focus of federal regulation, 
the benefits of monitoring and enforcement should be measured in terms of 
improvements to air quality. Unfortunately, previous research on the impact of 
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monitoring and enforcement has not examined that question. Instead, it has focused on 
the impact of monitoring and enforcement actions on compliance and emissions. Other 
research that examined air quality used nonattainment of NAAQS as a proxy for 
increased regulatory stringency and investigated the impact of nonattainment on air 
quality, instead of directly studying the impact of monitoring and enforcement actions on 
air quality.  
Many studies have explored the relationship between regulatory actions and a 
facility’s compliance and pollution releases for both air and water pollution. These 
studies usually use the lagged and predicted regulatory action variables to avoid reverse 
causality problems. As regulators are likely to perform more inspections and enforcement 
actions at facilities that release more pollution or commit more violations, not correcting 
for reverse causality can lead to the erroneous conclusion that regulatory actions cause 
noncompliance or higher emissions. Using lagged and predicted regulatory actions can 
solve this problem.  
Water pollution studies have investigated the relationship between regulatory 
action and effluent and compliance. For example, Magat and Viscusi (1990) measured 
the effect of inspections of pulp and paper plants on the plant’s compliance with the 
Clean Water Act and found that inspections in the previous quarter increased compliance 
and decreased effluent. Laplante and Rilstone (1996) found that the predicted probability 
of inspection produced larger reductions in effluent than actual inspections at pulp and 
paper plants in Quebec but Earnhart (2004a, b) found that actual inspections and 
enforcement actions reduced effluent but predicted inspections and enforcement actions 
had no significant impact at municipal wastewater plants in Kansas.  
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Articles that investigated air pollution have studied the impact of monitoring and 
enforcement on whether a facility complies with its permit limits, the duration a facility 
remains noncompliant, and emissions. For example, Gray and Deily (1996) found that 
predicted regulatory actions had no impact on CAA compliance at steel-making plants, 
but the actual number of inspections and enforcement actions improved compliance. In a 
later paper (Deily and Gray 2007), their investigation of the joint effect of environmental 
regulations and health and safety regulations yielded similar results.  
Nadeau (1997) studied how the number of inspections and enforcement actions 
affected the duration a facility remained out of compliance with its permit. He found that 
predicted monitoring and enforcement actions, when predictions were based on the 
noncompliant sample, significantly reduced the duration a facility remained 
noncompliant. Hanna and Oliva (2010) found that actual CAA inspections decreased 
emissions of toxic chemicals at manufacturing plants, but the probability of inspection 
had no significant effect.  
Even if the literature shows that monitoring and enforcement improve compliance 
and decrease emissions, low compliance and high emissions levels alone do not cause 
harm; rather, they cause harm through high ambient concentrations of pollution. Ambient 
air quality is an important measure of the success of regulation that has not been 
adequately studied. Although it seems natural that increased compliance and reduced 
emissions would result in better air quality, that might not be true due to other factors 
such as weather conditions or characteristics of the air basin. For example, if the weather 
conditions are not conducive to ozone formation, a decrease in emissions of ozone 
precursors might not improve air quality; alternatively, if the air basin’s geography 
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permits winds to transport pollutants away, then increased enforcement might lead to 
decreased emissions, but might not improve air quality. 
Literature that examined air quality does not examine the impact of regulatory 
actions on air quality. Instead, authors used NAAQS nonattainment as a proxy for more 
stringent regulatory requirements as facilities located in areas that are in nonattainment of 
the NAAQS face tougher regulatory requirements, such as lower emissions limits, that 
aim to bring the area into attainment of the NAAQS. Most of the literature found that 
nonattainment—and thus more stringent regulatory standards—improved air quality.  
There is ample evidence that the NAAQS improves air quality; this evidence 
comes primarily from studies comparing attainment and nonattainment areas. For 
example, Kahn (1997) examined trends in particulate matter between 1969 and 1992 and 
found that pollution per unit of manufacturing increased more in the less-regulated 
attainment counties. Examining the 1987 change in the particulate matter NAAQS from 
regulating total suspended particles (particles with a diameter of 40 micrometers or less) 
to regulating PM10 (particles with a diameter of 10 micrometers or less), he found that 
counties that transitioned from nonattainment of the total suspended particles standard to 
attainment of the PM10 standard produced double the amount of pollution per unit of 
manufacturing than before, implying that easing of regulations increased pollution. 
Henderson (1996) focused on ozone levels during the worst ozone month, July, and 
annual ozone levels, and found that ozone nonattainment significantly reduced July ozone 
levels, but not annual levels. Even though he found no effects on the annual ozone levels, 
the NAAQS proved effective at improving air quality at the time of year when ozone 
levels are usually the worst. 
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On the other hand, Greenstone (2004) analyzed the effect of attainment status on 
county sulfur dioxide levels between 1969 and 1997 but did not find consistently 
significant results. He suggested that this might be due to problems with the data: his data 
had many counties that had ambient levels below the national standard but were still 
classified as nonattainment areas. States are responsible for petitioning the EPA to get a 
county redesignated from nonattainment to attainment, a process which requires states to 
develop expensive models. Greenstone argued that, instead of going through this costly 
process, states might have informally requested, and the EPA agreed to, reduced 
regulatory oversight in such counties. Thus, in his view, nonattainment was not an 
accurate proxy for regulatory stringency and the finding of no significant effect was not 
surprising. 
Auffhammer, Bento, and Lowe (2009) suggested that Greenstone’s (2004) lack of 
significant results could be due to “averaging out”: the nonattainment dummy captures 
the average effect of regulation on all monitors in nonattainment counties. If regulators 
focused on the most polluted parts of a nonattainment county, this averaging out effect 
might wrongly suggest that regulations are not effective. They examined PM10 levels and 
found that being in a nonattainment county did not have an effect on the change in 
ambient PM10 levels—similar to Greenstone’s findings. However, monitors that had 
readings exceeding the national standard in the previous year showed marked declines in 
PM10 levels regardless of whether they were in attainment or nonattainment counties. 
This suggested that regulators focused on such “noncompliant” monitors.  
Thus, the literature has established that monitoring and enforcement improve 
compliance and decrease emissions, and being in nonattainment of the NAAQS can cause 
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improvements in air quality. However, researchers have not studied the direct link 
between regulatory actions and air quality. This chapter will contribute to the literature by 
exploring how monitoring and enforcement affect air quality. 
In the next section, I describe the regulatory framework of the CAA in California. 
The following sections describe the theoretical model, the data, and regression analysis. I 
provide concluding remarks in the final section.  
Regulatory Background 
Under § 109 of the CAA, the EPA establishes the NAAQS for six commonly 
found pollutants that harm health and the environment. These pollutants, also called 
criteria pollutants, are ozone, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur 
dioxide, and lead. Although the NAAQS are federal standards, states have primary 
responsibility for achieving or maintaining these standards. For instance, states are 
responsible for issuing stationary source permits and monitoring each source’s 
compliance with the permits. Of the criteria pollutants, ozone and PM2.5 (particulates with 
a diameter of 2.5 micrometers or less) cause the most significant human health effects 
(EPA 2011). Ozone is not emitted directly but is formed through reactions between 
nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds in the presence of sunlight. Ground-level 
ozone can cause respiratory problems to humans and damage vegetation. Under the 
ozone NAAQS, the annual fourth-highest daily maximum eight-hour concentration, 
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averaged over three years, should not exceed 0.075 parts per million (ppm).
21
 This 
standard was lowered from 0.08 ppm in 2008.
22
 
In California, stationary source monitoring and enforcement are handled primarily 
by thirty-five local air districts.
23
 Monitoring and enforcement practices depend on the 
type of source: major sources are sources that emit (or have the potential to emit) more 
than 100 tons per year of any pollutant and synthetic minor sources are sources that emit 
(or have the potential to emit) above 80% of the major source threshold (EPA 2001). In 
my analysis, I focus on inspections, enforcement actions, and penalties. There are two 
types of inspections, full compliance evaluations (FCEs) and partial compliance 
evaluations (PCEs), and three types of enforcement actions, notices of violation (NOVs), 
administrative orders, and consent decrees. Administrative orders and consent decrees are 
usually accompanied by penalties. 
An FCE is a comprehensive evaluation of the facility that addresses all regulated 
pollutants and emission units, and a PCE is an inspection that focuses on a subset of 
pollutants, requirements, or emission units (EPA 2001). Air districts typically perform an 
FCE once every two years for major sources and once every five years for synthetic 
minor sources. Districts typically perform PCEs when there are complaints, ongoing 
violations, or reports of equipment breakdown. All districts report FCEs to the EPA’s 
data system, but most districts do not report PCEs.  
                                                 
21
 Each day there are sixteen eight-hour averages and, naturally, one maximum of those sixteen eight-hour 
averages. Over the year, there are 365 of these maxima and one fourth-highest maximum. This fourth-
highest value is averaged over three years and compared to the air quality standard to determine the 
attainment status of the area. 
22
 Although 0.08 parts per million translates to 80 parts per billion, because of rounding, the limit was 
effectively 84 parts per billion.   
23
 Much of the regulatory background is covered in chapter 1; I provide a brief description here. 
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If regulators find a violation, they pursue enforcement action. There are three 
types of enforcement actions: NOVs, administrative orders, and consent decrees. The 
enforcement process begins with the discovery of a violation; inspectors can discover a 
violation through self-reporting, record review, or inspections. Upon discovering a 
violation, inspectors typically issue an NOV within a few weeks. District regulators place 
an emphasis on correcting violations; once detected, violations are usually remedied 
quickly, sometimes the same day.  
Districts typically handle violations administratively; after issuing an NOV, the 
district assesses a penalty and issues an administrative order. Additionally, an 
administrative order might have other components. For instance, it could contain a 
shutdown order, which orders the facility to shut down the piece of violating equipment. 
A shutdown order could cost the facility more than the penalty assessed, and this aspect 
of the enforcement process is important. However, I do not have any of these details 
about the administrative orders.  
The time between an NOV and an administrative order varies, but it typically 
takes less than nine months. It is worth noting that in California, unlike other 
jurisdictions, almost all NOVs end up as administrative orders and thus entail penalties.
24
 
However, because an administrative order can address multiple violations or multiple 
NOVs, there might not be a one-to-one relationship between NOVs and administrative 
orders.  
Some cases might go through the judicial process instead of the administrative 
process, which can take three to five years and usually ends in another type of 
enforcement action, a consent decree. However, this is rare and an overwhelming 
                                                 
24
 This is different from other jurisdictions where only some of the NOVs expose the facility to penalties. 
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majority of enforcement actions are administrative.
25
 Districts also vary in their reporting 
practices; all districts report violations that are considered high-priority violations,
26
 but 
some districts report some or all violations that are not considered high-priority 
violations.
27
 Penalties are part of the enforcement process but are not considered an 
individual enforcement action. Instead, penalties usually accompany administrative 
orders and consent decrees.  
In my analysis, I collapse both FCEs and PCEs into one inspections variable as 
this is more consistent with the literature and PCEs are not consistently reported by every 
air district. I also collapse NOVs, administrative orders, and consent decrees into one 
enforcement actions variable as administrative orders invariable follow NOVs and this is 
more consistent with the literature.  
Theoretical Model 
I extend the model from my previous chapter. In the previous chapter, I assume 
that each facility is run by a profit-maximizing, price-taking firm. Emissions of firm   are 
determined by the equation  
              , (11) 
                                                 
25
 Only 1.1% of enforcement actions in my data—EPA data for CAA-regulated facilities—are consent 
decrees. 
26
 High-priority violations are violations that the EPA believes should receive the “highest scrutiny and 
oversight” (EPA 1998, p. 3). These include more serious permit, emissions, and testing violations, and 
chronic violations. All districts report high-priority violations; the San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control 
District reports some of its violations that are not considered high-priority violations and the South Coast 
Air Quality Management District reports all of its violations regardless of whether they are considered 
high-priority violations.  
27
 Regulatory authorities also have other types of enforcement actions at their disposal, such as notices to 
comply. However, as these are not reported to the EPA database, I do not discuss them.  
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where    is the emissions for facility  ,    is the price of the facility’s output,    is the 
probability of detecting a violation, and    is the fine if the violation is discovered. I 
previously established that emissions are increasing in price and decreasing in probability 
of detection and the size of a fine (    ,     , and     ).  
Next, assume that there are   facilities around an air quality monitor and ambient 
concentration at the monitor is a function of the emissions of surrounding sources and 
background air quality,  
                        , (12) 
where   is the ambient concentration at the monitor,   is a of vector emissions from 
surrounding sources, and   is increasing in emissions (        ). I assume the 
relationship between ambient concentration and emissions is linear, so ambient 
concentration is determined by  






  , (13) 
where    is the transfer coefficient and       such that an increase in emissions at 
source   by     will increase ambient concentrations by      .  
For simplicity, I assume that all the facilities are similar and have the same output 
price, probability of detection, fine, and transfer coefficient. Thus, the ambient 
concentration,  , is determined by 
              , (14) 
where   is the emissions of the representative firm,   is the price of the output,   is the 
probability of detection,   is the fine, and   is the transfer coefficient. Thus, as emissions 
increase, ambient concentration increases (    ). 
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The partial derivative of   with respect to   and   are:  
             and (15) 
            . (16) 
As previously discussed,    ,    ,     ,     , and     ; therefore,      
and     . This means that as the probability of detection and the size of fines increase, 
ambient concentration decreases. Equation (14) also leads to the intuitive result that 
ambient concentration increases with the number of nearby facilities (    ) and 
increases with output price (    ). 
Inspections increase the probability of detection,  , and thus should decrease 
ambient concentration. Higher penalties increase   and thus decrease ambient 
concentration. Enforcement actions can affect both probability of detection   and fines  . 
An increase in the number of enforcement actions might reflect an increase in detection 
of violations,  ; at the same time, repeat offenders might also face larger fines, thus an 
enforcement action might reflect an increase in  . Therefore, enforcement actions should 
decrease ambient concentration.  
Data Description 
I obtain air quality data between 2003 and 2010 from the EPA’s Air Quality 
System database. The EPA tracks hourly ozone concentrations at air quality monitors in 
California. The database has information about the location of the air quality monitor as 
well as information on when the monitor was established and terminated. I focus on 
ozone because ozone has been identified as one of the criteria pollutants that cause the 
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most significant human health effects (EPA 2011) and I have more observations for 
ozone than for other pollutants.  
As the NAAQS measures the fourth-highest daily maximum eight-hour average 
against the federal standard, the effects of regulatory actions should show up in that 
measure. Using the EPA air quality data, I calculate the fourth-highest daily maximum 
eight-hour average ozone concentration at each air quality monitor for each year. I 
exclude all readings for which the state requested an exclusion due to special 
circumstances, such as wildfires. I also restrict the sample to air quality monitors that 
were operating through the entire time period. Whether this restriction biases my 
coefficients depends on the reasons that air quality monitors might be added or removed. 
If air quality monitors are added or removed for reasons unrelated to regulatory actions 
and air quality, then restricting the sample will not bias my coefficients.  
However, regulators are likely to add monitors in areas with poor air quality, and 
remove monitors in areas that have good air quality. Ambient ozone concentrations in 
areas with good air quality are likely to be less responsive to regulatory action; thus, this 
could cause my regressions to overestimate the effectiveness of regulatory actions.
28
 
Nonetheless, my regression coefficients would still be valid for areas with poor air 
quality.  
Table 11 presents summary statistics of ozone concentrations in parts per billion 
(ppb). The mean ozone level is 78.6 ppb and the standard deviation is 16.9. There is a 
general downward trend, with ozone concentrations decreasing from 83.8 ppb in 2003 to 
74.6 ppb in 2010. Figure 2 shows the decreasing trend of mean ozone concentrations over 
                                                 
28
 Future work can account for this problem by including air quality monitors that stop operating or begin 
operation during the study period.  
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time. Figure 3 shows the distribution of ozone concentrations, along with the 2008 ozone 
standard and 1997 ozone standard; there are no extremely large outliers and the peak of 
the distribution is slightly less than the 2008 standard of 75 ppb. 
The Air Facility System is the EPA’s database for CAA-regulated sources. The 
database contains details of each facility, such as its geographic coordinates, address, 
program identification number, and permit type. Additionally, it has details of regulatory 
actions since 2002: the date and type of regulatory action as well as the associated 
penalty. I limit my period of study to 2002-2010 because compliance monitoring policy 
and data reporting practices changed significantly in 2001 (EPA 2001). I classify all state 
and federal FCEs and PCEs as inspections, and all state and federal NOVs, administrative 
orders, and consent decrees as enforcement actions. To measure the intensity of 
regulatory activity around each monitor, I use regulatory activity at facilities within 20 
miles of the monitor.
29
 I drop all monitors that have no facilities located within twenty 
miles. As a robustness check, I run the regressions using different radii; these results are 
shown in Appendix B.  
Facilities that have shut down are removed from the EPA database, so it only has 
information on facilities that were still operating at the time the database was accessed. 
Thus, facilities that were in operation at the start of my study period, 2002, but shut down 
before the end of the period, 2010, are not in my data. Such an exclusion is likely to 
overstate the significance of my regression coefficients. Facilities shut down and reduce 
emissions, resulting in an improvement in air quality. Such an improvement is attributed 
                                                 
29
 This radius is somewhat arbitrary as factors affecting ambient ozone concentration at an air quality 
monitor can be quite specific to the monitor, such as surrounding geography and upwind emissions. While 
it might be more logical to examine how regulatory actions within an air basin affects the air quality in the 
air basin, this method would reduce the number of observations as there are only 15 air basins in California.   
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to fewer regulatory actions (those on existing facilities) than the true value (those on 
existing and shut-down facilities), thus overstating my regression coefficients.
30
 Facilities 
that began operations during my study period are in the data. 
Table 12 presents a summary of the inspections, enforcement actions, and 
penalties at facilities within 20 miles of each monitor. There is an average of 55.2 
facilities within 20 miles of the air quality monitor. I computed the total number of 
regulatory actions and the average number of regulatory actions within 20 miles of a 
monitor. There is an average of 72.8 inspections at all facilities around a monitor and an 
average of 1.7 inspections per facility.
31
 There is an average of 28.2 enforcement actions 
at facilities surrounding monitors and an average of 0.5 enforcement actions per facility. 
Lastly, there is an average penalty of $323,925 dollars and facilities faced an average of 
$4,682 in penalties. As most penalties are small but there are several very large penalties, 
in my regressions, I use the natural logarithm of penalties as an explanatory variable. 
Based on the theoretical model, I expect increased inspections, enforcement actions, and 
penalties to decrease ambient concentrations of ozone and an increase in the number of 
facilities to increase ambient concentrations of ozone. 
I control for NAAQS attainment status for other pollutants (carbon monoxide, 
PM10, and PM2.5) and demographic factors (per capita income, unemployment, and 
percent white) at the county-year level. Being in a nonattainment county might cause a 
facility to face pressure from the community to improve air quality, which is not reflected 
                                                 
30
 Future research can include those facilities, based on information obtained through a Freedom of 
Information Act request.  
31
 These numbers are somewhat different from those in chapter 1. For instance, the average number of 
inspections in chapter 1 is 1.9 but the analogous number in chapter 2 is 1.7. These are measuring different 
values. In chapter 1, the 1.9 average is the average number of inspections at the facilities that I could match 
to the California emissions data. In chapter 2, I first average the number of inspections at facilities around 
each air quality monitor; then I take the average of that number of all the monitors to get 1.7. 
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in regulatory activity. Thus, I expect nonattainment of the NAAQS to result in lower 
ozone concentrations. I get county NAAQS attainment status from the EPA’s Green 
Book and focus on attainment status for carbon monoxide, PM10, and PM2.5, and omit 
lead, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur dioxide because all California counties are in attainment 
of those standards.  
I get county per capita income information from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and include them in 
my regressions to control for the strength of the economy, the price of output and cost of 
input. I also obtain information about the percentage of white people in the county from 
the Census; counties with a high percentage of minority population might wield less 
political power and have less regulatory pressure to improve air quality, and omitting this 
might cause omitted variables bias.  
Additionally, I control for weather conditions as they affect ozone formation. As 
the worst ozone concentrations tend to occur during July, I control for July temperature, 
precipitation, and wind speed. I use the National Climatic Data Center’s Global Summary 
of the Day and match each air quality monitor to the nearest weather station. If there are 
no weather stations within 20 miles, I use a dummy variable to indicate missing weather 
data. Lastly, I use monitor fixed effects to control for time-invariant monitor 
characteristics and year dummy variables to control for time trends in air quality.
32
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 Mobile sources are a major source of ozone precursors, and future iterations of this chapter can account 
for traffic patterns around the air quality monitor to control for mobile source emissions.  
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Regression Analysis 
Regulators are more likely to target monitoring and enforcement actions at 
facilities around monitors that register poor air quality, so studying the impact of current-
year regulatory actions on air quality can cause the erroneous conclusion that regulatory 
action causes poor air quality. I use previous-year regulatory actions as the explanatory 
variable as current-year air quality cannot cause previous-year regulatory actions, thus 
avoiding reverse causality.  
Additionally, I use the fixed effects regression model, which examines the 
changes in air quality at the same air quality monitor over time. This method regresses 
the mean-differenced dependent variable on mean-differenced explanatory variables. It 
factors out any time-invariant characteristics of the air quality monitors such as location 
and surrounding geography, and can reduce problems presented by differences in the 
monitors. Furthermore, it is quite likely that regulators in areas that have persistently poor 
air quality are more stringent. Fixed effects will account for this, as long as the level of 
stringency does not change over time.  
Air quality is a function of regulatory action and other control variables. I 
assemble the data into a panel of monitor-years, and used monitor fixed effects to account 
for time-invariant individual characteristics. The regression model is represented by the 
equation  
                         
      
               , (17) 
where     is the ambient pollution concentration at monitor   in year  : the fourth-highest 
daily maximum eight-hour average for ozone (in ppb). Time-invariant monitor 
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characteristics, such as the location of the monitor, are captured by   . Year dummy 
variables,      , capture general time trends in ambient ozone concentrations.  
The variable                       represents regulatory action taken at nearby 
facilities in the previous year, such as the number of inspections and enforcement actions 
taken and penalties assessed. I use the total number of regulatory actions, such as the 
number of inspections or number of enforcement actions, taken in any given year as it 
provides a more complete picture: if facilities around a monitor are subject to more 
inspections, then it should show a larger effect on air quality than an air quality monitor 
that has fewer inspections. As regulatory action should improve air quality and decrease 
ambient concentrations of ozone, I expect the coefficients of regulatory action to be 
negative.  
However, the number of regulatory actions might be a reflection of the number of 
facilities surrounding a monitor, not necessarily the intensity of regulatory action.
33
 Thus, 
I also examine the average number of inspections, enforcement actions, or penalties at the 
surrounding facilities. As the impact of a regulatory action may depend on the size of the 
facility or its proximity to the monitor, it might make sense to weight regulatory actions 
based on those factors. However, I do not have any algorithm to weight these factors. 
Instead, I run robustness tests by considering all regulatory actions within 10, 15, and 30 
miles. These robustness tests are presented in Appendix B. 
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 This is mitigated to some extent by the fixed effects model which uses mean-differencing. For each 
variable, the regression model deducts each monitor’s mean, across time. This forms the model: 
     ̅  (                                      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  )
 
        ̅                  ̅ ,  
where  ̅  
 
 
∑   . Thus, the model only uses differences from the mean of the number of regulatory 
actions. 
 62 
Other time-varying characteristics are captured by    . This includes the number 
of facilities around a monitor, controls for county demographic characteristics (income, 
unemployment rate, and percent white), county attainment status (particulate matter and 
carbon monoxide attainment status), and weather characteristics (July mean temperature, 
total rainfall, and mean wind speed). I expect that an increase in the number of facilities 
around a monitor will increase ozone concentrations. Income and unemployment reflect 
the strength of the economy: an increase in economic activity is likely to result in 
increased emissions and thus increases in ozone concentrations. However, an increase in 
income also results in an increase in the value of clean air, which might decrease ozone 
levels. As minorities might wield less political power, a higher proportion of white 
population may result in lower ozone concentrations. Lastly, as sunlight is needed for 
ozone formation, I expect mean temperature to be positively related with ozone 
concentrations. Precipitation and wind remove pollutants from the air, so I expect total 
precipitation and wind speed to be negatively related with ozone concentration.  
Regression (1) of Table 13 displays the effect of the total previous-year 
inspections, enforcement actions, and penalties on ozone concentrations. The number of 
enforcement actions has no significant impact on the ozone concentration, and, as 
expected, an increase in the number of facilities increases ozone concentrations. An 
additional inspection decreases ozone concentration by 0.008 ppb. This effect is 
significant at the 10% level. Although the coefficient seems small, the relatively large 
number of inspections can still generate a large impact. For instance, the average number 
of inspections is 72.8, which reduces ozone concentrations by 0.583 ppb, compared to no 
inspections; increasing the number of inspections from the 25th percentile (13 
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inspections) to the 75th percentile (80 inspections) of the distribution of inspections 
reduces ozone concentrations by 0.536 ppb. 
Additionally, penalties have a negative and significant impact on ozone. As the 
dependent variable is the level of ozone concentration and the explanatory variable is the 
natural logarithm of the penalty, the coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of a 
percentage increase in penalty on the level of ozone concentration: increasing the penalty 
by 1% would reduce ozone concentrations by approximately 0.002 ppb. The average 
penalty is $323,925, which reduces ozone concentrations by 2.017 ppb compared to a 
penalty of $1; increasing the penalty from the 25th percentile ($14,000) to the 75th 
percentile ($125,000) of the penalty distribution reduces ambient ozone concentration by 
0.348 ppb.  
Monitors in PM2.5 nonattainment counties have ozone concentrations 3.499 ppb 
lower than attainment counties. This is likely because particulate matter nonattainment is 
a serious problem in California, and there are other unobserved factors that put pressure 
on these nonattainment counties to improve air quality. Additionally, increased 
unemployment reduces ambient concentrations of ozone. This is not surprising as 
unemployment is a proxy for economic activity, and poor economic performance should 
decrease ambient pollution. On the other hand, increased income reduces ambient ozone 
concentrations. This is somewhat surprising as income is a proxy for economic activity, 
and increased economic activity should worsen air quality. Perhaps higher income 
indicates better paying, less polluting jobs or an increase in the value of clean air, 
resulting in better air quality. Lastly, as expected, mean temperature increases ozone 
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concentrations, but total precipitation and mean wind speed have no impact on ozone 
concentration.  
Regression (2) of Table 13 displays the impact of the average number of 
inspections and enforcement actions and the natural logarithm of the average penalty at 
the facilities around the monitor. The penalty variable remains significant; increasing the 
average penalty by 1% reduces the ambient ozone concentration by 0.002 ppb.
34
  
Additionally, as a test for robustness, I run the same regressions using the natural 
logarithm of ozone as the dependent variable.
35
 The literature uses both levels and natural 
logarithms: for instance, Henderson’s (1996) study used the natural logarithm of ozone 
concentrations, while Auffhammer, Bento, and Lowe’s (2009) study used the level of 
PM10 concentrations. The results are presented in Table 14. In regression (1), the 
coefficient for inspections is negative and significant: increasing the number of 
inspections by one decreases ozone concentrations by 0.011%. The coefficient of 
penalties is also negative and significant. As both the dependent and explanatory 
variables are logarithms, the coefficient can be interpreted as the elasticity of ozone 
concentrations with respect to penalties: increasing the penalty by 1% decreases the 
ozone concentration by 0.002%. The interpretation for the average regulatory actions in 
regression (2) follows similarly. Notably, an increase in the average penalty by 1% 
decreases ozone concentrations by 0.002%. Although these coefficients seem small, 
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 Admittedly, the mean penalty of $4,682 is probably small compared to the facility’s operating costs. It is 
possible that the facilities are not deterred by the average penalty, but are concerned about the potential for 
far larger penalties, and the average penalty merely reflects this possibility. In Appendix B, I examine 
whether the maximum penalty improves air quality. 
35
 As shown in Figure 3, my data do not have large outliers. Thus, using natural logarithms might not be 
necessary. 
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given the large number of inspections and the large total penalty, the regulatory actions 
still make a relatively large impact on ozone concentrations.  
Next, as another robustness test, I perform the first differences regression, which 
regresses the change in ozone concentrations from the previous year on the change in the 
explanatory variables from the previous year. When using the first-differences model, I 
lose one year of data (168 observations). The regression equation is: 
                           
       
             , (18) 
where                . The results are shown in Table 15. Across the two regressions, 
the coefficients of enforcement actions are negative and statistically significant. In 
regression (1), increasing the number of enforcement actions by one is associated with a 
decrease in ozone concentrations by 0.016 ppb. In regression (2), increasing the average 
number of enforcement actions by one is associated with a decrease in ozone 
concentrations by 0.849 ppb. The coefficients of penalties are no longer significant. 
Oddly, an increase in the number of facilities is associated with a decrease in the 
ambient concentrations of ozone. Perhaps this is due to natural progression over time as 
the number of facilities increases over time and ozone concentrations also decrease over 
time. Other than these differences, the first differences regressions are similar to the fixed 
effects regressions. 
Robustness Tests  
In this section, I examine whether the results in the fixed effects regressions are 
sensitive to varying specifications. In Table 16 and Table 17, I show that the results are 
robust to omitting various control variables. Table 16 shows the coefficients of the impact 
 66 
of the total number of regulatory actions in regressions that omit various control 
variables. Regression (1) shows the coefficients of the regulatory variables when I run the 
fixed effects regression in equation (17) while omitting the total number of facilities 
surrounding the air quality monitor. The coefficient of penalties remains statistically 
significant: increasing the penalty by 1% reduces ozone concentrations by approximately 
0.002 ppb. Regressions (2) to (5) show that the size and significance of the coefficient of 
penalties are robust to omitting various control variables. The coefficient of inspections is 
not as robust; it is significant in only three of the five specifications. Similarly, Table 17 
shows the impact of the average number of enforcement actions and the size of the 
penalty. The size and significance of the penalty coefficient is robust across the 
specifications. 
Next, I examine whether omitting year dummy variables changes the results. 
Regressions (1) and (2) of Table 18 show that the effect of the penalty is robust to 
omitting time trends: the coefficient of penalties is negative and statistically significant.  
Additionally, I examine how using pooled ordinary least squares, instead of fixed 
effects, affects the results. I run this regression  
                         
      
              , (19) 
where, instead of having an intercept for each air quality monitor,   , there is a common 
intercept term,  . As shown in regressions (3) to (6) of Table 18, the coefficient of the 
penalty variable is positive, quite large, and significant. Although the usual interpretation 
of such a coefficient is that penalties cause an increase in ozone concentrations, it is far 
more likely that regulators impose higher penalties around monitors that report persistent 
air quality problems. Using fixed effects accounts for such causality problems. 
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Lastly, I examine the robustness of the first differences regressions by comparing 
them to the differences-in-differences regressions. The differences-in-differences 
regression specification can account for general trends in ozone concentrations, 
regulatory actions, and other explanatory variables. The regression equation is  
       
                      
        
          
    , (20) 
where    
            . Table 19 shows the regression results. Compared to the first 
differences results in Table 15, the size and significance of the coefficient of the 
enforcement variable is similar; enforcement actions still decrease ambient ozone 
concentrations. However, in regression (1), an increase in the number of inspections 
seems to be associated with an increase in ozone concentrations.  
In Appendix B, I show that using different radii—for example, counting the total 
number of regulatory actions within 30 miles of the air quality monitor, instead of 20 
miles—does not affect the results, and I also investigate possible instrumental variables. 
Conclusion 
This chapter is the first article that examines the impact of inspections and 
enforcement actions on ambient air quality. Previous research has found that 
nonattainment of federal air quality standards and the more stringent regulatory regime 
that follows nonattainment improve air quality. However, the literature has not examined 
the impact of monitoring and enforcement actions on air quality. In this chapter, I find 
that penalties significantly improve air quality: increasing the total penalty at facilities 
around an air quality monitor by 1% improves ozone concentrations by 0.002 ppb. At the 
average penalty of $323,925, this translates into a 2.017 ppb improvement. This result is 
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fairly robust. Additionally, there is some evidence that enforcement actions improve air 
quality. This complements the results in my previous chapter, which found that penalties 
decrease emissions of nitrogen oxides.   
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Tables  
Table 11. Mean Ozone Ambient Concentration in ppb 
Year Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
2003 83.770 (19.689) 41.500 137.625 
2004 78.721 (15.209) 41.125 122.750 
2005 76.736 (19.085) 34.250 130.125 
2006 81.318 (18.184) 43.500 125.500 
2007 76.362 (15.941) 45.857 126.250 
2008 79.517 (15.825) 38.663 120.875 
2009 77.014 (14.285) 38.000 108.500 
2010 74.593 (14.191) 25.000 109.761 
Overall 78.575 (16.913) 25.000 137.625 
Source: Author’s calculations and EPA Air Quality System. 
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Table 12. Descriptions and Means of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Description Mean (Std. dev.) 
Number of 
facilities 
Number of facilities within twenty miles of 
the air quality monitor. Source: EPA. 
55.221 (77.351) 
Inspections Previous-year full and partial compliance evaluations performed at 
surrounding facilities. Source: EPA. 
 Total Total number of inspections performed.  72.826 (105.658) 
 Average Average number of inspections performed. 1.666 (1.319) 
Enforcement 
actions 
Previous-year notices of violation, administrative orders, and consent 
decrees issued at surrounding facilities. Source: EPA. 
 Total Total number enforcement actions issued.  28.189 (50.996) 
 Average Average number of enforcement actions 
issued. 
0.463 (0.714) 
Penalty Previous-year penalties assessed at surrounding facilities, in thousands 
of dollars. Source: EPA. 
 Total Total penalty at the surrounding facilities. 323.925 (1,104.261) 
 Average Average penalty at surrounding facilities. 4.682 (16.892) 
NAAQS non-
attainment 
Indicator for whether the county, in which the monitor is located, was 
out of attainment of NAAQS (1 = nonattainment). Source: EPA. 
 CO non-
attainment 
Indicator for whether the county was out of 
attainment of the carbon monoxide standard. 
0.116 (0.320) 
 PM10  non-
attainment 
Indicator for whether the county was out of 




Indicator for whether the county was out of 




Unemployment rate in the county, in percent. 
Source: BLS. 
8.136 (3.957) 
Income Per capita income in the county, in thousands 
of dollars. Source: BEA. 
37.489 (9.943) 
Percent white Percent white population in the county. 
Source: Census. 
81.775 (9.130) 
July weather July weather at the nearest weather station within twenty miles. 
Source: NCDC. 
 Temperature Mean temperature in July, in degrees 
Fahrenheit.  
74.831 (9.914) 
 Precipitation Total precipitation in July, in inches. 0.027 (0.154) 
 Wind speed Mean wind speed in July, in knots. 5.850 (2.091) 
Source: Author’s calculations, EPA, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Census, and National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). 
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Table 13. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Impact of Regulatory Actions 
in the Previous Year on Ozone Concentrations 
Regulatory Actions
a
 Total Average 
  (1) (2) 






Enforcement actions in 
the previous year  
-0.002 -0.253 
(0.005) (0.373) 












PM10 nonattainment -1.472 -1.502 
(1.377) (1.390) 
PM2.5 nonattainment  -3.499** -3.841** 
(0.965) (0.944) 
Percent white 
population of the county 
-0.450 -0.449 
(0.464) (0.465) 
Mean income of the 
county (/$1000)  
-0.280* -0.275* 
(0.140) (0.139) 
Unemployment rate of 







July mean temperature 0.229** 0.231** 
 (0.086) (0.087) 




July mean wind speed 0.059 0.057 
 (0.148) (0.149) 
Observations 1,224 1,224 
Number of monitors 167 167 
Adjusted R-squared 0.289 0.288 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard 
errors in parentheses; missing weather and year dummy 
variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“total” and “average”) refer to the 
explanatory regulatory actions variable. 
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Table 14. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Impact of Regulatory Actions in 
the Previous Year on the 100 * Natural Log of Ozone Concentrations 
Regulatory Actions
a
 Total Average 
  (1) (2) 






Enforcement actions in 



















PM10 nonattainment -0.932 -1.006 
(1.647) (1.666) 




Percent white population 
of the county 
-0.745 -0.720 
(0.616) (0.617) 
Mean income of the 
county (/$1000)  
-0.472* -0.452* 
(0.197) (0.195) 
Unemployment rate of 
the county  
-0.527 -0.557 
(0.420) (0.419) 
July mean temperature 0.255* 0.260* 
 (0.101) (0.102) 




July mean wind speed 0.041 0.039 
 (0.220) (0.220) 
Observations 1,224 1,224 
Number of monitors 167 167 
Adjusted R-squared 0.241 0.241 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard 
errors in parentheses; missing weather and year dummy 
variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“total” and “average”) refer to the 
explanatory regulatory actions variable. 
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Table 15. First Differences Regressions of the Impact of Regulatory 
Actions in the Previous Year on Ozone Concentrations 
Regulatory Actions
a
 Total Average 
  (1) (2) 




Enforcement actions in 
the previous year  
-0.016** -0.849* 
(0.006) (0.398) 












PM10 nonattainment 0.060 0.141 
(1.912) (1.911) 
PM2.5 nonattainment  1.364 1.180 
(1.442) (1.477) 
Percent white 
population of the county 
0.261 0.300 
(0.536) (0.535) 
Mean income of the 
county (/$1000)  
-0.682** -0.685** 
(0.144) (0.146) 
Unemployment rate of 
the county  
0.452 0.453 
(0.396) (0.398) 
July mean temperature 0.443** 0.444** 
 (0.108) (0.108) 




July mean wind speed 0.088 0.080 
 (0.194) (0.192) 
Observations 1,056 1,056 
Number of monitors 166 166 
Adjusted R-squared 0.186 0.185 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard 
errors in parentheses; missing weather and year dummy 
variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“total” and “average”) refer to the 










Table 16. Coefficients of Total Regulatory Actions in Fixed Effects Regression of the Impact of Regulatory Actions on 
Ozone Concentration, Omitting Various Control Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Total inspections in the previous year -0.005 -0.012* -0.008 -0.010* -0.013* 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Total enforcement actions in the previous 
year 
-0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Total penalty in the previous year (log) -0.152* -0.154* -0.141* -0.160** -0.141* 
(0.061) (0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) 
Number of surrounding facilities 
 
     
NAAQS nonattainment (CO, PM10, and 
PM2.5) 
     
Demographic variables (income, 
unemployment, and percent white) 
     
Weather variables (mean temperature, 
total precipitation, and mean wind speed) 
     
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; number of surrounding facilities, 
NAAQS nonattainment, demographic variables and weather variables included in some specifications but not shown; 











Table 17. Coefficients of Average Regulatory Actions in Fixed Effects Regression of the Impact of Regulatory Actions 
on Ozone Concentration, Omitting Various Control Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Average inspections in the previous year -0.238 -0.286 -0.223 -0.334
+
 -0.369* 
(0.175) (0.177) (0.177) (0.170) (0.171) 
Average enforcement actions in the 
previous year 
-0.299 -0.291 -0.354 -0.242 -0.293 
(0.375) (0.383) (0.373) (0.380) (0.380) 
Average penalty in the previous year (log) -0.198* -0.190* -0.175* -0.206* -0.181* 
(0.083) (0.085) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) 
Number of surrounding facilities 
 
     
NAAQS nonattainment (CO, PM10, and 
PM2.5) 
     
Demographic variables (income, 
unemployment, and percent white) 
     
Weather variables (mean temperature, 
total precipitation, and mean wind speed) 
     
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; number of surrounding facilities, 
NAAQS nonattainment, demographic variables and weather variables included in some specifications but not shown; 










Table 18. Regression Coefficients of Regulatory Actions in Fixed Effects Regressions of the Impact of Regulatory Actions in the 
Previous Year on Ozone Concentrations 
 
Fixed Effects without Year 
Dummies 
Ordinary Least Squares without 
Fixed Effects with Year Dummies 
Ordinary Least Squares without 
Fixed Effects and Year Dummies 
Regulatory Actions
a
 Total Average Total Average Total Average 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







(0.006) (0.196) (1.097) (0.506) (1.094) (0.456) 
Enforcement actions 
in the previous year 
-0.008 -0.465 -0.816 0.015 -0.958 -0.050 
(0.005) (0.401) (1.368) (0.810) (1.407) (0.833) 
Penalty in the 
previous year (log) 
-0.172** -0.222** 52.635** 0.599** 51.241** 0.579** 
(0.058) (0.079) (16.140) (0.209) (15.995) (0.207) 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; number of surrounding facilities, NAAQS 
nonattainment, demographic variables, and weather variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“total” and “average”) refer to the explanatory regulatory actions variable. 
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Table 19. Differences-in-Differences Regressions of the Impact of Regulatory 
Actions in the Previous Year on Ozone Concentrations 
Regulatory Actions
a
 Total Average 
  (1) (2) 






Enforcement actions in 
the previous year  
-0.012* -1.212** 
(0.005) (0.448) 












PM10 nonattainment -0.176 0.399 
(2.152) (2.124) 
PM2.5 nonattainment  -0.331 -1.089 
(1.317) (1.302) 
Percent white 
population of the county 
0.524 0.586 
(0.687) (0.681) 
Mean income of the 
county (/$1000)  
-0.035 -0.102 
(0.177) (0.169) 
Unemployment rate of 
the county  
-0.762 -0.735 
(0.553) (0.538) 
July mean temperature 0.120* 0.125* 
 (0.058) (0.058) 




July mean wind speed -0.028 -0.006 
 (0.127) (0.135) 
Observations 895 895 
Number of monitors 162 162 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.165 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard 
errors in parentheses; missing weather and year dummy 
variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“total” and “average”) refer to the 





















Figure 3. Distribution of Ozone Concentration 
 







INVESTIGATING ESCALATING PENALTIES FOR REPEAT  
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS 
Introduction 
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders are common in the law. For example, 
under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) civil penalty guidelines, a 
violator’s history of noncompliance can increase the size of the penalty assessed (EPA 
1984). Indeed, it seems like common sense that those that have repeatedly shown 
disregard for the law should be subject to increasing punishment for their actions. 
However, existing theoretical research in law and economics has not been able to justify 
the ubiquity of escalating penalties, and there is little existing empirical research that 
investigates the existence and impact of escalating penalties.  
In this chapter, I examine the theoretical and empirical literature on escalating 
penalties, as applied to environmental regulation, and analyze possible implications for 
repeat offender policy. First, I analyze the law and economics theory regarding escalating 
penalties for repeat offenders and suggest some possible extensions to the theory that can 
account for the impact of fairness and the social norm of law compliance. Second, I 
discuss the empirical literature that examines repeat offenders in environmental 
regulation.  
Third, I present my empirical analysis of repeat offenders in air pollution 
regulation in California. I find that most facilities comply: over half the facilities did not 
commit any violations over the entire nine-year study period. Even repeat offenders are 
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not assessed very large penalties, implying that their violations are not very serious. I also 
find no evidence of increasing penalties. Additionally, I find that facilities with long 
spells of noncompliance face smaller penalties on average, indicating that the “worst 
actors,” with the longest spells of noncompliance, are committing less severe violations 
on average than the better actors. Thus, while my data do not show escalating penalties, it 
is likely because repeat violations are less severe and any escalation is mitigated by the 
reduced severity of the subsequent violation. 
The Theory of Escalating Penalties 
The theoretical law and economics literature has focused on the optimality of the 
enforcement regime, explaining how a regime of escalating penalties for repeat offenders 
can improve social welfare. Generally, these models use mathematical equations to 
represent each individual’s utility and decisions, and they assume that regulators aim to 
maximize social welfare—the sum of all individuals’ utilities.36 
In this section, I describe the model of efficient public law enforcement, and then 
discuss various models that examine the optimality of escalating penalties. I explore 
several models that argue that decreasing penalties are optimal, then analyze models that 
rely on various assumptions to justify escalating penalties.
37
 Lastly, I discuss which 
assumptions are the most realistic. I believe a model in which the gains to the violator are 
not counted in social welfare and different types of violators have different benefit from 
                                                 
36
 In this chapter, I use environmental regulation as an example, although a lot of this literature is applicable 
to other types of public law enforcement, such as the criminal justice system.  
37
 Although my analysis divides the models by their assumptions, it is important to note that many models 
rely on more than one of these assumptions. 
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each violation is the most realistic. I also describe potential additions to the models that 
can better account for fairness and the social norm of law compliance.  
Optimal Deterrence Theory 
In order to maximize social welfare, regulators should aim for optimal deterrence, 
not complete deterrence (Polinsky and Shavell 2000a).
38
 As some individuals might stand 
to gain more than society is harmed by a violation, complete deterrence, which deters all 
individuals from committing the violation, might not be socially efficient. Instead, 
regulators should deter only violations that would harm society more than they benefit 
the violators, and imposing an expected penalty that equals to the harm provides optimal 
deterrence.  
Based on this model of optimal deterrence,
39
 it is difficult to justify escalating 
penalties for repeat offenders. If the penalty scheme induces optimal behavior and only 
socially beneficial violations are committed, then deviating from the optimal penalty, by 
making the penalty depend on previous violations, will incentivize inefficient behavior. 
Nonetheless, some models show that escalating penalties can be efficient because they 
allow regulators to focus costly regulatory effort on a smaller group of repeat violators.   
Models that Support Decreasing Penalties 
Several theoretical models advocate decreasing penalties for repeat violations. 
The underlying intuition is relatively simple: in order to detect a repeat violation, 
regulators must detect a first violation. As regulators are more likely to impose a penalty 
                                                 
38
 Even though the EPA cannot consider costs when setting the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 
regulators are still permitted to consider costs in making enforcement decisions.  
39
 There have been other models that consider non-economic factors, for instance, Polinsky and Shavell 
(2002b) describe a model that accounts for fairness. 
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for the first violation than for a repeat violation, it makes sense to maximally deter the 
first violation.  
For instance, Burnovski and Safra (1994) described a model in which individuals 
decide how many violations to commit, and found that the optimal policy involved 
decreasing penalties. Emons’s (2003) two-period model allowed individuals to choose to 
violate in each time period, and he found that decreasing penalties are optimal. In a later 
paper, he (Emons 2004) found that decreasing penalties are subgame perfect.  
Dana (2001) examined escalating penalties in the context of behavioral biases. He 
argued that first-time offenders underestimate detection because of optimism bias and 
repeat offenders overestimate detection because of salience. Therefore, he asserted, 
decreasing penalties make more sense.  
Thus, even though escalating penalties create additional deterrence for repeat 
offenders, some models argued that decreasing penalties are optimal because they deter 
the first violation, thus deterring repeat violations. 
Minimizing Enforcement Costs 
Enforcement is costly, and many researchers have found that escalating penalties 
can reduce enforcement costs and thus improve social welfare. Harrington’s (1988) 
model divided firms into two groups: a compliant group and a noncompliant group. Firms 
in the compliant group face a lower probability of detection and a lower penalty if they 
are found in violation; if found in violation, they are moved to the noncompliant group, 
where they face a higher probability of detection and a higher penalty if they are found in 
violation again. Firms in the noncompliant group may move back into the compliant 
group if they are found to be in compliance.  
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Harrington found that, because detection is costly, the regulator can save on 
detection costs by concentrating its enforcement effort on the small noncompliant group 
and imposing higher penalties on that group if a violation is found. However, this model 
does not fully explain why escalating penalties are optimal because Harrington assumed 
that penalties are higher in the noncompliant group. In a later model that had less 
restrictive assumptions, Harford (1991) found that the optimal penalty in both groups is 
the maximum penalty and the optimal solution does not involve escalating penalties.  
Polinsky and Shavell (1998) developed a two-period model in which it is efficient 
to treat repeat offenders more harshly. In their scheme, the optimal policy is to impose 
the maximum possible penalty for any offense in the first period; in the second period, 
regulators impose the maximum possible penalty on those that are considered repeat 
offenders and impose a smaller penalty on those who are considered first-time offenders. 
This penalty scheme is somewhat unusual because first-time offenders in the second 
period are treated differently than first-time offenders in the first period and the penalties 
for the first and second violations are the same. Thus, this model does not describe 
escalating penalties. 
Although these models do not fully justify escalating penalties, they provide some 
insight as to how escalating penalties might improve social welfare by reducing detection 
and enforcement costs.  
Changes in Benefits from Violation and Detection Probabilities  
Some authors justify escalating penalties using changes in the violator or 
regulator between the first violation and repeat violations. For example, a firm with a 
history of environmental violations might lose customers, thus reducing its profits. Miceli 
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and Bucci (2005) found that, if opportunity costs for repeat violations are smaller, 
escalating penalties are needed to maintain deterrence.
40
 
Several articles examined the role of learning. For instance, Friehe (2009) showed 
that if violators are unsure if their acts are violations but overestimate the probability that 
they are violations, escalating penalties are optimal. In Mungan’s (2010) model, violators 
could learn to evade detection, and regulators could learn to detect violations. He found 
that if violators learned more than regulators did, escalating penalties are optimal.  
Repeated Violations Reveal Information About the Violator 
Many models divided potential violators into types and used repeated violations 
as a mechanism to reveal information about the violator. For instance, Emons’s (2007) 
two-period model assumed that individuals choose whether to be law abiding; he found 
that, if the benefit from the violation is high relative to the individual’s wealth, the 
regulator imposes increasing penalties to induce individuals to be law abiding.  
McCannon (2009) divided violators into occasional violators and habitual 
violators. He made three assumptions: (1) violations by occasional violators are socially 
beneficial; (2) violations by habitual violators are socially undesirable; and (3) habitual 
violators gain more from a violation than occasional violators.
41
 He found that, under 
these assumptions, increasing penalties are optimal. A central assumption of the model is 
that violations by different types of violators cause different amounts of harm, thus 
justifying escalating penalties. However, it is not clear why the same violation by 
                                                 
40
 The authors assumed that all gains from violation are illicit and are not counted in social welfare. 
However, they admitted that, if the benefit from violation is counted in social welfare, then optimal 
penalties would not escalate as individuals would fully account for future lost income when deciding 
whether to violate. 
41
 In other words, he assumed that                                                    
            . 
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different types of violators should cause different amounts of harm, especially in the 
context of environmental regulation.  
Miceli’s (2012) model used three types of potential violators: those with a low 
gain, those with a high gain, and undeterrable, irrational violators.
42
 The author found 
that escalating penalties are desirable as the fraction of undeterrable offenders in the 
population becomes high. While this model justifies escalating penalties, it is not very 
applicable to environmental regulation as it requires irrational firms to be a high 
proportion of the regulated community.  
These models rely on repeat violations to reveal information about the violator 
and reduce enforcement costs by allowing the regulator to focus enforcement resources 
on those who are more likely to violate. This structure is applicable to environmental 
regulation as facilities with high abatement costs likely gain more from violation (by 
avoiding the abatement costs) than those with low abatement costs; thus, escalating 
penalties allow regulators to deter these facilities more strongly.  
Illicit Gains from Violation 
Other models consider some or all of the violator’s gain from the violation as 
“illicit gains,” which are not considered in the social welfare function but still drive the 
violator’s decision to violate. While this assumption is not traditional, it is perhaps more 
realistic. The EPA (1984, 1991) guidelines advise that the penalty should, at a minimum, 
remove all the benefit derived from a violation.
43
 This implies that regulators consider 
this gain at least somewhat illegitimate.  
                                                 
42
 The author treats gains for violation as illicit and does not include gains from violation in the social 
welfare function.  
43
 The penalty guidelines also consider the harm caused by the violation. More specifically, the penalty has 
a benefit component, which accounts for the benefit derived from the violation, and a gravity component, 
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Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) developed a model in which individual actors have 
an unobservable illicit gain from committing a violation. The illicit gain could, for 
instance, represent the individual’s propensity to violate. Individuals with higher illicit 
gains are more likely to violate repeatedly, and, because the illicit gains are not counted 
in the social welfare function, violators with higher illicit gains must be deterred more 
strongly. They found that, for certain parameter values, higher penalties on repeat 
offenders are optimal.  
Baik and Kim (2001) extended the Polinsky and Rubinfeld model to include 
sociological characteristics by allowing illicit gains to change over time. They found that, 
if the change in illicit gains is large compared to the initial illicit gains, it is desirable to 
punish repeat offenders as seriously as first-time offenders. This is because individuals 
anticipate the future increase in illicit gains, and first-time offenders must be punished 
more severely in order to offset that future increase in illicit gain. They also found that, 
for certain parameter values, escalating penalties are optimal.  
Implications of Theory and Possible Extensions 
Although illicit gains are a somewhat unconventional assumption, they match up 
with the moral intuition that individuals should not benefit from their wrongdoing and the 
EPA (1984, 1991) penalty guidelines that encourage regulators to, at minimum, assess 
the full benefit of a violation. In my opinion, the strongest case for escalating penalties is 
that regulators consider some or all of the gains from a violation as illicit.  
                                                                                                                                                 
which considers other factors, including the harm caused by the violation, the importance of the violation to 
the regulatory scheme, and the size of the violator. The gravity component can be further adjusted to reflect 
the degree of willfulness or negligence in the violation, the violator’s degree of cooperation, the violator’s 
history of noncompliance, and resulting environmental damage. 
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Each firm’s illicit benefit of violation is not necessarily unobservable to the 
regulator; for instance, the EPA uses models to estimate the economic benefit of 
violation. Nonetheless, repeat violations reveal that the previous penalties have been 
insufficient to deter and the facility has an otherwise unobservable higher propensity to 
violate. Thus repeat violations can reveal that the violator’s gains are high (or higher than 
the regulator previously thought), so escalating penalties are warranted. Focusing on 
these facilities could be the best way to allocate a regulator’s limited budget. Thus, a 
combination of illicit gains from violation, facility type, and cost minimization can justify 
escalating penalties. Nonetheless, I believe models should incorporate the social norm of 
law compliance and a sense of fairness to better explain escalating penalties.  
Social norms likely drive managers’ decisions on whether to comply with 
environmental regulations. While there are many norms at play (Vandenbergh 2003), I 
focus on the norm of law compliance as it can produce positive externalities; a strong 
norm of law compliance can allow regulators to achieve a high compliance rate with 
relatively little enforcement resources.  
Many models accommodate concerns other than the monetary gain from 
violation; for instance, Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) suggested that the illicit gains in 
their model might represent the propensity to commit an offense. Similarly, for 
environmental regulations, one could model the social norm of law compliance as the 
illicit gain portion of the facility’s decision to violate. Within a facility, individual 
managers make compliance decisions; these decisions are, in turn, influenced by the 
facility’s culture and attitude towards law compliance (Simpson et al. 2013). Those 
facilities with a strong desire to comply with the law would benefit less from a violation 
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than those with less desire to comply, even though the monetary benefit might be the 
same. Thus, to the extent that these models allow for individuals to benefit differently 
from a violation, they are, implicitly, accounting for this social norm. 
However, norms can change in response to regulators’ decisions, and these 
models have not accounted for that.
44
 In the case of repeat violations, escalating penalties 
could be part of the norm of law compliance. If penalties do not escalate, then penalties 
might be seen as the price of a violation (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000) that can be bought 
freely in the market for environmental compliance. This, in turn, could weaken the norm 
of law compliance. Thus, the strength of the norm, modeled as an illicit benefit of 
violation, could depend on how much penalties escalate. 
Lastly, regulators are likely concerned about fairness to the regulated entities and 
the community affected by pollution. The concern regarding fairness towards the 
regulated entities likely imposes some limitations on the maximum penalty.
45
 Although 
many models described the maximum penalty as limited by wealth, Harrington (1988) 
suggested that large penalties could be viewed as unfair, placing practical limits on 
penalties. Thus, many of these models that assumed a maximum penalty implicitly 
accounted for this; however, they do not allow the maximum penalty to vary based on 
violation history.  
A sense of fairness could limit the maximum penalty differently for first and 
repeat violations. For example, a large penalty for the first violation might seem unfair, 
especially if the facility had made some effort to comply. Thus, fairness could limit the 
                                                 
44
 At the most basic, if there is a very low enforcement rate, then the norm of law compliance might get 
much weaker. In an economic model, this could be modeled as a change in benefit from a violation that 
depends on the probability of detection. 
45
 Although there are statutory limits on penalties as well, these limits are generally very high and not 
binding. 
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maximum penalty for first-time violations. On the other hand, repeat violations might 
show that the facility is not making any effort to comply, and a large penalty for a repeat 
violation might not seem unfair. Thus, fairness might restrict maximum penalties for the 
first violation but allow larger maximum penalties for repeat violations. 
Alternatively, fairness could be part of the social welfare function. For instance, 
Polinsky and Shavell (2000b) introduced a model in which the fairness of a penalty, 
which depends on the size of the penalty, is part of the objective function that the 
regulator maximizes. A modification to their model, which allows the fairness of the 
penalty to depend on the size of the penalty and the facility’s violation history, would 
allow researchers to investigate the role fairness plays in escalating penalties. 
The regulator might also be concerned about fairness to the surrounding 
community. While it might be willing to tolerate occasional violations, if a facility 
violates repeatedly, it repeatedly releases pollution in the same affected community. 
Society might believe that some environmental damage is inevitable, but it might believe 
that this damage should be spread equally throughout the population in general, instead of 
being focused on the same community surrounding the repeat violator. Thus, out of a 
sense of fairness, regulators might impose increasing penalties so that a surrounding 
community does not have to put up with persistently poor environmental quality.  
Thus, these law and economics models that analyzed illicit gains, different types 
of violators, and enforcement costs provide the most likely justification for escalating 
penalties. Nonetheless, none of them explains the phenomenon fully, and accounting for 
social norms and fairness could improve the models.  
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Existing Empirical Evidence Regarding Escalating Penalties 
The empirical literature that specifically examines escalating penalties for repeat 
violations in environmental regulation is somewhat sparse. There is little information on 
how prevalent repeat offenders are and how regulatory policy treats them. In this section, 
I will describe some of the evidence regarding repeat offenders. First, I briefly discuss the 
different types of deterrence and how they relate to repeat violations. Second, I describe 
various studies that investigated whether poor compliance history increases the size of 
penalties. Third, I discuss studies that examined the impacts of regulatory actions on 
repeat violations.  
Penalties provide two types of deterrence, specific deterrence and general 
deterrence. Specific deterrence discourages the same violator from violating again in the 
future, while general deterrence discourages other entities from violating. Thus, research 
that examines the effectiveness of specific deterrence can be said to examine repeat 
violations, even if it does not focus on escalating penalties. For instance, Weber and 
Crew (2000), in their analysis of oil spills, found that penalties were effective at reducing 
amount of oil spilled, but Viladrich Grau and Groves (1997) found that penalties had no 
impact on the frequency of oil spills and amount of oil spilled during oil transfer. Helland 
(1998) investigated inspection targeting, not escalating penalties, and found evidence of 
inspection targeting based on the facility’s compliance history, but no evidence that such 
targeting improved compliance outcomes.  
Most of the articles that examined repeat offenders examined the characteristics 
of repeat offenders and whether the size of penalties depends on violation history. While 
it is EPA policy to assess higher penalties on those with a violation history (e.g., EPA 
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1984, 1991), actual practice might differ from policy. For instance, the EPA guidelines 
allow regulators to consider the firm’s ability to pay when it is assessing penalties (EPA 
1991), and regulators may be reluctant to assess large penalties as that might cause 
facilities to shut down and employees to lose their jobs (Gray and Deily 1996); thus, 
penalties might not escalate.  
Denning and Shastri (2000) examined the characteristics of companies against 
whom the EPA brought civil suits that were not settled.
46
 Of the firms in their sample, 
they found that 34.6% of the public companies were repeat offenders, and 12.6% of non-
profit organizations were repeat offenders. Additionally, 8.4% of closely held firms were 
repeat offenders. 
Oljaca, Keeler, and Dorfman (1998) examined the determinants of penalties for 
water pollution violations in Georgia. They found that firms with a history of violations 
received a penalty that was, on average, $5,616 larger. This is quite large compared to the 
average penalty of their sample, $12,786. Kleit, Pierce, and Hill (1998) investigated the 
determinants of penalties on water pollution violations in Louisiana. In their analysis, an 
enforcement action could result in a compliance order or a penalty, and they investigated 
how the number of previous violations affected whether the enforcement action resulted 
in a penalty and the size of the penalty. They found that increasing the number of 
previous violations increased the probability that the facility was issued a penalty and 
finally agreed to pay a penalty. Additionally, they found that an increase in the number of 
previous violations by one increased the penalty assessed for a violation by $4,580 and 
increased the final agreed settlement by $2,180. 
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 Note that this sample is not typical of environmental enforcement actions; under many federal 
environmental statutes, states are responsible for a majority of the enforcement actions and they usually 
resolve the cases administratively. 
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Simpson, Garner, and Gibbs (2007) examined repeat violations at the firm level. 
This study is different as most enforcement studies focus on the facility level, not the firm 
level, and substantial research is needed to understand the corporate ownership of the 
facilities. They found that enforcement actions and inspections had no impact on their 
measure of recidivism, the number of violations committed by the firm in that quarter. 
Miller (2005) examined all federal regulatory actions against U.S. companies for 
environmental violations between 1970 and 1997 and found that civil judicial law suits 
were not more effective than administrative actions, which carry lower penalties, at 
reducing repeat violations. However, he found that criminal suits significantly reduced 
repeat violations. 
Generally, there has been very little empirical research on escalating penalties and 
repeat offenders. A few studies found that penalties increased as violation history 
increased (Denning and Shastri 2000; Oljaca, Keeler, and Dorfman 1998). Others found 
mixed evidence on the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement actions on repeat 
violations at the firm level: Simpson, Garner, and Gibbs (2007) found that enforcement 
actions had no impact on repeat violations at the firm level, while Miller (2005) found 
that civil enforcement actions were not effective but criminal enforcement actions were.  
New Empirical Research on Repeat Violators and Escalating Penalties 
In this section, I present my research into the nature of escalating penalties for 
repeat offenders in California air pollution regulation and show that, generally, repeat 
offenders are not a serious problem. I show that facilities are quite compliant, even 
though there is no evidence of escalating penalties. Furthermore, facilities that have long 
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spells of noncompliance receive smaller penalties, on average, than those that have short 
spells of noncompliance, implying that repeat violators commit less severe violations on 
average.  
Data Description and Summary Statistics 
My study focuses on California because its persistent air quality problems and 
aggressive monitoring and enforcement policy provide an interesting case study. I obtain 
monitoring and enforcement data from the EPA’s Air Facility System (AFS) database. 
Regulatory data are available between 2002 and 2010; I limit my period of study to the 
period after 2001 because compliance monitoring policy and data reporting practices 
changed significantly in late 2001 (EPA 2001).  
The AFS is the EPA’s database for sources regulated by the Clean Air Act. The 
database contains details of each polluting facility and regulatory actions carried out 
against it.
47
 I restrict the sample to facilities that existed during the entire study period 
because the EPA removes facilities that have shut down from the AFS.  This restriction 
could cause selection problems if repeat violators are forced to shut down by escalating 
penalties. This would weaken my finding that penalties do not escalate; it would also 
imply that escalating penalties are effective at reducing future violations. Additionally, if 
the worst violators are the ones that are forced to shut down, then my analysis of the 
repeat violator policy will be missing a crucial piece of the puzzle—the impact of the 
policy on the worst violators.
48
 However, this might not be an issue because regulators 
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 For enforcement actions, I only have information on the size of the penalty, not the nature of the 
enforcement action. Escalating penalties could manifest as a more stringent enforcement action, such as a 
shutdown order instead of a compliance order. Unfortunately, I cannot study this because I lack the 
necessary data.  
48
 Future research can overcome this problem by examining facilities that have shut down. For instance, I 
could examine whether those facilities tend to be repeat violators, and whether they were assessed 
escalating penalties. I have obtained this data through a Freedom of Information Act request. 
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generally try to avoid causing facilities to shut down as it entails job loss. Furthermore, 
both EPA (1991) guidelines and the California Health and Safety Code allow regulators 
to consider the violator’s ability to pay when deciding the penalty.  
There are 1,355 facilities over nine years, which makes 12,195 observations. 
Table 20 shows a summary of the number of inspections and enforcement actions and 
total penalty per facility-year. There is a mean of 1.79 inspections per facility-year, and 
63.4% of facilities-years received at least one inspection. The mean number of 
enforcement actions is 0.60 and 17.1% of the facility-years had at least one enforcement 
action. The mean penalty per facility-year is $6,993. However, only 12.7% of the facility-
years had any penalties. Conditional upon a penalty, the mean is $54,910.  
Evidence of Escalating Penalties 
I treat receiving a penalty as an indication of noncompliance as it represents the 
termination point of the violation and the regulator’s decision that the facility has 
committed a violation severe enough to warrant a penalty. If a facility was assessed a 
penalty in the year, I treat the facility as noncompliant for the year. As shown in Table 
20, the average noncompliance rate is 12.7%. Table 21 shows the number of years the 
facilities were noncompliant over the entire period. Over half of the facilities in the 
sample had no violations for the entire period; 19.7% spent one year in violation and 
12.3% spent two years in violation. A majority of the facilities were relatively compliant; 
83.6% of the facilities spent two or fewer of the nine years in violation. On the other end 
of the spectrum, three facilities (0.2%) were in violation for all nine years and nine 
facilities (0.7%) were in violation for eight of the nine years.  
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Next, I use regression analysis to examine escalating penalties. Table 22 shows 
the impact of the natural logarithm of the size of previous-year penalties on the natural 
logarithm of the size of current-year penalties for facilities with both previous- and 
current-year violations. I control for other variables on the county-year level: 
unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, income from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, percent white from the Census Bureau, and National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards nonattainment from the EPA’s Green Book.  
The regression shows no evidence of increasing penalties. Instead, the regression 
implies decreasing penalties: an increase in the previous-year penalty by 1% is associated 
with a 0.21% decrease in the current-year penalty. This shows that, for facilities that are 
in violation for two consecutive years, penalties do not escalate; instead, penalties are 
decreasing. Note that previous-year enforcement actions are associated with an increase 
in penalties, showing that violation history can increase penalties.
49
 Naturally, this 
analysis applies only to instances in which facilities were found to be in violation for two 
consecutive years.   
Penalties over the Spells of Noncompliance 
Lastly, I examine the length of the spells of noncompliance. I consider a 
noncompliance spell as a number of consecutive years that a facility is noncompliant. 
Thus, if a facility was noncompliant in years 2004 and 2005 but compliant in all other 
years, its maximum noncompliance spell is two years. If a facility was noncompliant in 
2004 and 2006 only, then its maximum noncompliance spell is one year. I consider 
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 Future iterations of this study can investigate the different impacts of enforcement actions that result in 
penalties and enforcement actions that do not. This will allow me to disentangle the different impacts of the 
penalty and the enforcement action.  
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facilities that have a noncompliance spell of at least two years as repeat offenders.
50
 
Table 23 shows a summary of the lengths of the longest noncompliance spells of each 
facility. Most facilities have short noncompliance spells; 31.7% of the facilities have 
noncompliance spells of one year. Other facilities can be considered repeat offenders: 
9.8% have noncompliance spells of two years, and 6.9% have noncompliance spells of 
three years or longer. A total of 16.7% of the facilities can be considered as repeat 
offenders at some point during the time period. 
Next, I examine the nature of repeat violations. Table 24 shows the trend of the 
penalty as the noncompliance spell progresses for facilities that have completed spells of 
noncompliance.
51
 I omit from this table facilities with incomplete spells of 
noncompliance—facilities whose longest spell of noncompliance was still ongoing in 
2010, the last year of available data. Focusing on the second column of the table, there 
were 116 facilities whose longest spell of noncompliance was two years long. The mean 
penalty during the first year of the noncompliance spell was $61,307. The standard 
deviation was $303,926, and the median was $3,779. During the second year of 
noncompliance, the mean penalty was $67,640 and the median penalty was $3,000. The 
difference in means is not statistically significant (p = 0.92).
52
 I also calculated each 
facility’s total penalty over the entire noncompliance spell and the per-year penalty over 
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 In this case I consider another violation of the Clean Air Act by the same facility in the next year as a 
repeat violation. Naturally, the definition of repeat violations can vary. For example, one could define a 
repeat violation as another violation of any environmental statute by the same firm in the next five years 
(EPA 2008). 
51
 If there were more than one noncompliant spells of the same maximum length, I use the first 
noncompliance spell. 
52
 These figures, with the mean much larger than the median and a large standard deviation, indicate that 
there are several very large values. For instance, the maximum penalty during the first year of 
noncompliance was $2.44 million, while the maximum for the second year of noncompliance was $6.50 
million. (The two penalties were at different facilities.) Thus, I also included the medians in the table. 
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the entire noncompliance spell. The average total penalty was $128,947, while the 
median total penalty was $8,525. The median per-year penalty was $4,263. 
If penalties escalate for repeat violations, then penalties for the second year of 
noncompliance should be higher than those for the first year of noncompliance, penalties 
for the third year of noncompliance should be higher than those for the second year of 
noncompliance, and so on. However, looking at Table 24, this is not entirely the case.
53
 
While penalties generally increase in the first two years of noncompliance, they do not 
keep increasing after that. For instance, for those with spells of noncompliance of four or 
more years, the first-year mean penalty is $28,761 and the median penalty is $6,635. For 
the second year, the mean increases to $29,171 and the median increases to $8,040. But, 
for the third year, although the mean penalty increases to $75,840, the median decreases 
to $6,220. Based on this table and on Table 22, it seems that, if penalties escalate, they do 
not escalate very much.  
Regulators likely focus on the severity of the violation in determining the size of 
the penalty; less severe violations draw smaller penalties. Thus, decreasing penalties 
likely show that subsequent violations are less serious than previous violations, not 
necessarily that the size of penalties are not affected by violation history. If there is 
penalty escalation for repeat violations, it is not obvious and might be obscured by a 
decrease in penalty due to a decrease in the severity of the violation. Nonetheless, there is 
no evidence that the regulators increase penalties sharply to bring the facilities into full 
compliance.  
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 Even if the penalties decline, it might still be considered escalating penalties if the repeat violations are 
less severe. I discuss this later in the chapter.  
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Moreover, penalties seem to be lower, on average, for those with longer 
noncompliance spells. Focusing on the first two years of noncompliance, those with four 
or more years of noncompliance were assessed lower penalties ($28,761 and $29,171) 
than those with three years of noncompliance ($44,553 and $40,137), which, in turn, 
were assessed lower penalties than those with two years of noncompliance ($61,307 and 
$67,640). Additionally, per-year penalty seems to be lower for facilities with longer 
noncompliance spells. For instance, the average penalty for those with noncompliance 
spells of four or more years is $41,029, which is lower than the penalty for those with 
three-year spells, $49,129. In turn, this is lower than the average for those with two-year 
spells. Again, this implies that those with longer noncompliance spells, on average, 
commit less severe violations.  
However, the median per-year penalty increases for those with longer 
noncompliance spells, perhaps an indication of escalating penalties for at least some of 
the facilities. It is possible that penalties escalate slightly for most facilities, but 
fluctuations in the severity of the violations tend to dominate these small escalations in 
penalties.  
Table 25 shows the statistics for facilities whose longest noncompliance spells 
continued through to the last year of the available data. There are far fewer observations, 
with 51 in total. These facilities seem quite different from those with completed spells of 
noncompliance. The 18 facilities that had one-year noncompliance spells that ended the 
year my data ended had been compliant for the entire period, 2002-2009, but violated in 
the last year, 2010. For these facilities, the mean penalty is rather high, $241,076, likely 
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driven by an outlier.
54
 The median penalty is $2,000, which is slightly smaller than that at 
facilities that had completed spells of noncompliance. Based on this column, even first-
time offenders can be assessed large penalties, likely because of the severity of the 
violation.  
Generally, those that were in violation for a relatively long period of time and 
were still in violation by the end of the period could be considered to be bad actors. Even 
then, they were not assessed very high penalties. The mean penalty is generally quite low; 
for example, those in years six and seven of their violation spell were assessed a mean of 
$15,849 and $21,371 (and a median of $10,200 and $16,325).
55
 For those that were in 
violation for all nine years of the data, the mean penalty in the ninth year of their 
violation was $5,597 and the median was $5,000. That is one of the lowest mean and 
median penalties. Thus, even those that are persistently noncompliant might not receive 
high penalties.  
Thus, Table 24 and Table 25 show that there are some persistent repeat offenders. 
However, taking the size of the penalty as an indication of the severity of the offense, 
repeat offenders might not be the worst actors.
56
 Although the median penalties for the 
repeat offenders tend to be higher, the means are lower in many instances.  
These tables also imply at least mixed evidence regarding escalating penalties. 
While these tables look at the trends in penalties over time, they do not account for other 
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 The largest value is $3,826,000 and the second largest value is $458,278. 
55
 However, there are, occasionally, very large penalties among these bad actors. For instance, the 
maximum penalty for the eighth year of noncompliance was $456,500. 
56
 Ideally, I would have some information on the severity of violations and would use that information to 
determine which facilities are the worst actors. Unfortunately, my data do not contain information on the 
severity of the violations. While certain types of violations, high-priority violations, are more severe than 
other types of violation, my data do not have information on the type of violation. Moreover, many 
California air districts report only high-priority violations to the EPA database. Thus, to the best of my 
knowledge, the only proxy for the severity of the violation is the size of the penalty. 
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factors and the analysis is somewhat limited. Unfortunately, I have no information on the 
severity of the violation. Assuming that larger penalties are assessed for more serious 
violations, it seems likely that some firms with shorter noncompliance spells are, on 
average, committing more serious violations and thus receiving larger penalties.  
Summary of Empirical Results 
These statistics suggest certain patterns. First, a vast majority of the facilities are 
very compliant; 71.3% of the facilities spent one or fewer years in violation over the 
nine-year period (Table 21). Second, there seems to be no clear pattern of escalating 
penalties. For facilities that spend two consecutive years in violation, there is no evidence 
of increasing penalties (Table 22). Over longer noncompliance spells, there is some 
evidence of escalating penalties: the median per-year penalty increases as the 
noncompliance spell progresses (Table 24). However, this escalation effect seems to be 
dominated by the severity of the violation as the mean penalty can be lower in later years 
of the noncompliance spells. If there are escalating penalties, it is not the main factor in 
consideration; the regulator does not assess huge penalties for the mere fact of a previous 
violation.  
Third, turning to each facility’s longest spell of noncompliance, 83.3% had 
noncompliance spells of one year or less. Thus, based on the definition of repeat 
offenders being those that had at least two consecutive years of noncompliance, only 
16.7% of the facilities were, at some point in the nine-year period, repeat offenders 
(Table 23). Finally, at least some facilities with longer noncompliance spells are, on 
average, assessed smaller penalties than those with shorter noncompliance spells (Table 
24). This implies that facilities with longer spells of noncompliance are committing less 
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serious violations. Thus, even the persistently noncompliant facilities might not be the 
worst actors.  
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Law and economics theory has had some success in explaining the prevalence of 
escalating penalties. Some models rely on the concept of illicit gains, that some or all of a 
facility’s benefit from a violation should not be counted in social welfare, to justify 
escalating penalties as optimal. While that is a somewhat unconventional assumption to 
economics, judging by the EPA’s penalty policies, I believe it is more realistic. 
Additionally, some models assume some types of violators benefit more than other types, 
and escalating penalties are required to deter those that benefit more from violation. 
When applied to environmental regulation, this seems likely as different facilities have 
different abatement costs; those that have high abatement costs can be thought of as the 
type of violator that stands to benefit the most from violating. Thus, models that explain 
escalating penalties based on illicit gains and different types of violators are the most 
realistic representation of current policy.  
Nonetheless, these models can be further improved by accounting for the social 
norm of law compliance and fairness. The social norm of law compliance can be 
introduced as part of the illicit gain, and is thus included in many existing models. 
Furthermore, social norms may change depending on the regulator’s actions; escalating 
penalties might be necessary to reinforce the social norm of law compliance. For 
example, if regulators do not impose escalating penalties, penalties might start to seem 
like the price of a violation that can be purchased from the regulator, thus weakening the 
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norm of law compliance. In theoretical models, illicit gains from the norm of law 
compliance might be a function of how steeply the penalty escalates for repeat offenders.  
Additionally, regulators are concerned with fairness to the regulated entity and the 
affected community. Specifically, penalties might escalate because a sense of fairness 
limits the penalty for a first-time offender but not for a repeat offender. Regulators might 
also escalate penalties because fairness dictates that the same community situated around 
the repeat violators should not have to bear the cumulative cost of the facility’s repeated 
violation. Some environmental damage is inevitable, but regulators might believe that 
environmental damage should be spread throughout the population, instead of being 
concentrated on the community surrounding repeat violators. Thus, repeat violations 
cause more harm than first-time violations by offending this sense of fairness. This 
increased harm, in turn, can justify increasing penalties.  
Empirically, there is existing evidence that shows that repeat offenders receive 
higher penalties, but the evidence is somewhat mixed on whether enforcement actions 
affect repeat violations. My empirical analysis shows that most facilities are compliant. 
Repeat violations do occur, but there is limited evidence that penalties escalate. 
Moreover, facilities with the longest spells of noncompliance have lower per-year 
average penalties than facilities with shorter spells of noncompliance. This indicates that 
facilities with longer spells of noncompliance are committing less serious violations than 
facilities with shorter spells of noncompliance. These repeat offenders are not necessarily 
the worst actors as their violations are less severe.  
This has two implications. First, it shows that repeat violations can be complex. 
Persistent repeat violators are not necessarily the worst actors as they might be 
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committing less severe violations. Any future research into repeat violations should 
examine the severity of violations as well. Second, the current repeat offender policy 
seems to be working well, even if my data show that penalties do not escalate. Very few 
of the facilities are persistent violators, and the persistent violators seem to commit less 
severe violations on average.  
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Tables 
Table 20. Means for Inspections or Enforcement Actions and Penalty Amount per 
Facility-Year 
 Mean (Std. dev.) Proportion positive 
Inspections 1.785 (3.333) 0.634 
Enforcement actions 0.603 (2.972) 0.171 
Penalty (/$1,000) 6.993 (126.288) 0.127 
Given penalty > 0    
  Penalty (/$1,000) 54.910 (350.251)  
Source: Author’s calculations and EPA Air Facility System, 2002-2010. 
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Table 21. Statistics for the Total Number of Years a Facility Was in Violation 
Years in violation Number Percentage 
0 699 51.6 
1 267 19.7 
2 167 12.3 
3 96 7.1 
4 49 3.6 
5 34 2.5 
6 18 1.3 
7 13 1.0 
8 9 0.7 
9 3 0.2 
Total 1,355 100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations and EPA Air 
Facility System, 2002-2010. 
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Table 22. Fixed Effects Regression of the Impact of the Size of 
Previous-Year Penalties on the Size of Current-Year Penalties for 














Unemployment rate 0.276** 
(0.089) 
Income (/$1000) -0.087 
(0.111) 
Percent white -0.355 
(0.221) 
PM10 nonattainment 0.358 
(0.408) 








Adjusted R-squared 0.123 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses; year dummy 
variables and fixed effects included but not shown. 
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Table 23. Summary of Length of Longest Noncompliance Spell 
Length of longest 
noncompliance spell 
Number Percentage 
0 699 51.6 
1 430 31.7 
2 133 9.8 
3 51 3.8 
4 17 1.3 
5 5 0.4 
6 5 0.4 
7 3 0.2 
8 9 0.7 
9 3 0.2 
Total 1,355 100.0 
Source: Author’s calculation and EPA Air 
Facility System, 2002-2010. 
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Table 24. Mean, (Standard Deviation), and [Median] of Penalty/1,000 During a 
Facility’s Longest Completed Noncompliance Spell 
 Length of Noncompliance Spell in Years 
 
1 2 3 ≥ 4 All 
Year 1 54.058 61.307 44.553 28.761 53.429 
penalty (439.454) (303.926) (141.898) (52.685) (388.182) 
(/$1,000) [2.500] [3.779] [6.250] [6.635] [3.000] 
Year 2   67.640 40.137 29.171 54.906 
penalty   (603.176) (89.322) (44.959) (469.421) 
(/$1,000)   [3.000] [6.750] [8.040] [4.500] 
Year 3     62.699 75.840 67.990 
Penalty   
 
(161.210) (291.541) (221.317) 
(/$1,000)   
 
[6.200] [6.220] [6.220] 
Year 4       22.980 22.980 
penalty    
  
(54.760) (54.760) 
(/$1,000)       [6.500] [6.500] 
Year 5   
  
185.003 185.003 
penalty   
  
(655.194) (655.194) 
(/$1,000)   
  
[6.000] [6.000] 
Year 6       31.185 31.185 
penalty    
  
(42.541) (42.541) 
(/$1,000)       [15.000] [15.000] 
Year 7   
  
42.676 42.676 
penalty    
  
(35.352) (35.352) 
(/$1,000)   
  
[23.750] [23.750] 
Year 8       61.855 61.855 
penalty    
  
(41.107) (41.107) 
(/$1,000)       [77.900] [77.900] 
Total 54.058 128.947 147.388 283.692 87.280 
penalty (439.454) (671.928) (277.084) (638.881) (496.697) 
(/$1,000) [2.500] [8.525] [21.300] [57.250] [4.500] 
Per-Year 54.058 64.474 49.129 41.029 55.013 
penalty (439.454) (335.964) (92.361) (87.327) (392.360) 
(/$1,000) [2.500] [4.263] [7.100] [12.756] [3.090] 
Observations 412 116 46 31 605 
Source: Author’s calculation and EPA Air Facility System, 2002-2010. 
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Table 25. Mean, (Standard Deviation), and [Median] of Penalty/1,000 During a 
Facility’s Longest Incomplete Noncompliance Spell 
 Length of Noncompliance Spell in Years 
 
1 2 3 ≥ 4 All 
Year 1 241.076 8.550 11.465 104.705 111.643 
penalty (901.073) (12.852) (16.251) (249.564) (547.034) 
(/$1,000) [2.000] [2.700] [5.075] [16.500] [2.970] 
Year 2 
 
4.998 4.790 24.276 11.392 
penalty 
 
(6.893) (6.626) (42.855) (26.244) 
(/$1,000) 
 
[2.250] [2.400] [10.800] [3.500] 
Year 3 
  
2.900 286.099 197.599 
Penalty 
  
(2.488) (811.373) (676.214) 
(/$1,000) 
  
[2.000] [15.000] [7.300] 
Year 4 
   
41.267 41.267 
penalty  
   
(62.449) (62.449) 
(/$1,000) 
   
[15.000] [15.000] 
Year 5 
   
119.590 119.590 
penalty 
   
(267.661) (267.661) 
(/$1,000) 
   
[22.910] [22.910] 
Year 6 
   
15.849 15.849 
penalty  
   
(12.783) (12.783) 
(/$1,000) 
   
[10.200] [10.200] 
Year 7 
   
21.371 21.371 
penalty  
   
(23.275) (23.275) 
(/$1,000) 
   
[16.325] [16.325] 
Year 8 
   
110.155 110.155 
penalty  
   
(194.422) (194.422) 
(/$1,000) 
   
[34.900] [34.900] 
Year 9    5.597 5.597 
penalty     (1.488) (1.488) 
(/$1,000)    [5.000] [5.000] 
Total 241.076 13.548 19.155 639.759 229.467 
penalty (901.073) (14.197) (22.484) (1172.963) (780.185) 
(/$1,000) [2.000] [7.000] [11.800] [140.000] [8.000] 
Per-Year 241.076 6.774 6.385 102.474 110.072 
penalty (901.073) (7.098) (7.495) (197.489) (542.929) 
(/$1,000) [2.000] [3.500] [3.933] [22.574] [4.000] 
Observations 18 17 5 11 51 




ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS FOR CHAPTER I 
In this appendix, I further examine the robustness of my Chapter I empirical 
results. First, I examine whether excluding facilities that participate in the Regional Clean 
Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program affects my results. The RECLAIM program 
is a cap-and-trade program for the largest emitters of NOx and sulfur oxides in the South 
Coast Air Quality Management District. Table 26 and Table 27 show the regression 
results when I exclude facilities that participate in the RECLAIM program. These tables 
show that the results in Table 5 and Table 6 are robust to dropping RECLAIM facilities; 
the coefficients maintain their significance and are larger in magnitude. This is not 
surprising as RECLAIM facilities’ NOx emissions are limited by their emissions permits, 
and less so by regulatory action. 
Next, I examine whether my results in Table 5 and Table 6 are robust to omitting 
various control variables. Table 28 shows the impact of regulatory actions on major 
sources. The coefficients are very similar in significance and magnitude to regression (2) 
of Table 5 and regression (2) of Table 6, regardless of which control variables are 
omitted. Table 29 displays analogous regressions for the balanced panel, and Table 30 
displays analogous regressions for manufacturing facilities. The coefficients are robust to 
omitting various control variables.  
Next, I examine whether my results are affected by using first differences instead 
of fixed effects. First differences regression is another method of accounting for time-
invariant facility characteristics. The first differences regression method regresses the 
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change in the dependent variable on the changes in the explanatory variable. The 
regression equation is  
                           
       
             , (21) 
where                . The results are shown in Table 31 and Table 32. 
Unfortunately, the coefficients are not significant. Perhaps this is due to the reduced 
sample size: using first differences instead of fixed effects reduces the sample size 
because I lose one year of data. 
Additionally, I also run a differences-in-differences regression in order to account 
for possible trends in emissions and regulatory actions. The regression equation is 
       
                      
        
          
    , (22) 
where                   . The results are shown in Table 33 and Table 34. Much 
like the first-differences regressions, the coefficients for regulatory action are not 
significant, again perhaps due to a smaller sample size. 
Lastly, I explore instrumental variables, another method of accounting for reverse 
causality. Shimshack and Ward (2005) used inspection rate at other facilities in the 
jurisdiction as an instrument for inspections in the current time period. They argued that 
inspections at other facilities in the same jurisdiction were uncorrelated with the 
individual facility’s compliance or emissions, but were correlated with the probability of 
inspection, thus creating a valid instrument. For my data, the same logic as Shimshack 
and Ward’s applies, but the link might be attenuated. For example, inspection frequencies 
are relatively fixed, once every two years for major facilities, so the inspection rate at 
other facilities in the same jurisdiction might not reflect the probability of inspection very 
accurately. Additionally, while the enforcement rate at other facilities might be correlated 
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with a regulator’s strictness, enforcements actions are probably determined by whether 
there was a violation more than they are determined by the regulator’s strictness.  
I employ a similar set of instruments.
57
 For the number of regulatory actions 
directed at a facility in the current year, I use the average number of the same regulatory 
action directed at other facilities in the same air district in the current and previous years. 
For the dummy variable of whether the facility was subjected to a specific regulatory 
action in the current year, I use the proportion of other facilities in the same air district 
that were subject to the same regulatory action in the current and previous years. As 
instrumenting for all three regulatory action variables at the same time creates very weak 
instruments, I instead instrument for only one variable at the time. The regression 
equation is  
                                   
      
               , (23) 
where               is the instrumented regulatory action for facility   in period  , and 
                 is a vector of the other regulatory variables, which are not 
instrumented, for facility   in the previous period    . Thus, if I am instrumenting for 
inspections,               will consist of instrumented current-year inspections and 
                 will consist of previous-year enforcement actions and penalties. I run 
this regression equation three times, instrumenting for each regulatory action (while using 
the lags for the other regulatory actions).  
Table 35 shows the coefficients and standard errors for the instrumented activity, 
as well as the p values for the endogeneity test, the F-statistics for instrument strength, 
                                                 
57
 I also looked into the CARB budget as a possible instrument. However, while there is information on the 
general budget for CARB’s stationary source enforcement, information on the budget for each district was 
not publicly available.  
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and the p values for the overidentification test. When I run a fixed effects regression 
equation (23) instrumenting for the presence of current-year inspections and using lagged 
regulatory variables for the presence of enforcement actions and penalties, the results are 
shown in the rows for inspections in column (1) of Table 35. Thus, the coefficient for 
current-year inspections is -4.07 and the cluster-robust standard error is 7.37, which 
indicates that inspections do not have a significant impact on emissions. I do not show the 
coefficients for the other variables as they are not very different from previous 
regressions shown. I also test whether the endogenous regressor, current-year inspections 
in this case, can be treated as exogenous; the p value is 0.73, and I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that current-year inspections can be treated as exogenous. Next, I test the 
strength of the instruments (the current- and previous-year proportion of other facilities in 
the same air district that were inspected). The instrument is strong, with an F-statistic of 
97.20, above the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10.
58
 I also perform the Sargan-Hansen test 
of overidentifying restrictions, which tests whether the instruments are exogenous. The p 
value is 0.52, and I cannot reject the hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Column (2) 
presents the coefficient and related statistics when the explanatory variable is the number 
of inspections at the facility.  
None of the coefficients for the instrumented variables are statistically significant. 
Interestingly, the test for endogeneity never rejects the hypothesis that the regulatory 
variable is exogenous, perhaps implying that endogeneity is not a concern for the sample. 
This might be the case if inspections and enforcement actions are determined in advance 
with little room for discretion.  
                                                 
58
 For errors that are not independently and identically distributed, Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2007) 
recommend comparing the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic against the rule-of-thumb threshold of ten. 
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Table 26. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Impact of the Presence of Regulatory Actions 
in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions, without RECLAIM Facilities 
Sample
a
 All Major Balanced Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Presence of any inspections 
in the previous year 
0.161 2.248 0.167 1.982 
(1.998) (3.493) (2.354) (3.942) 
Presence of any enforcement 
actions in the previous year 
2.837 3.647 3.753 6.972 
(3.227) (3.927) (3.558) (5.603) 






 -8.827* -14.500* 
(4.044) (4.783) (4.481) (6.846) 
PM10 nonattainment -3.661 1.861 -1.337 -11.060 
(8.522) (12.889) (10.041) (19.662) 
PM2.5 nonattainment -2.200 -3.039 -2.341 3.508 








(4.425) (5.859) (4.691) (7.687) 
Carbon monoxide 
nonattainment 
-4.728 -7.404 -3.544 -4.403 
(5.971) (7.842) (6.858) (10.825) 
Unemployment rate -2.531 -2.829 -2.893 -6.852 
(4.052) (5.082) (4.355) (8.973) 
Income (/$1000) 0.072 -0.027 -0.022 1.532 
(1.158) (1.702) (1.265) (3.087) 
Percent white -6.696
+
 -8.648 -6.610 -8.375 
(4.028) (5.949) (4.392) (7.683) 
Observations 3,931 2,757 3,331 1,805 
Facilities 722 494 556 334 
Adjusted R-squared 0.960 0.959 0.961 0.965 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; year 
dummy variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“all,” “major,” “balanced,” and “manufacturing”) refer to the sample 




Table 27. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Impact of the Number of Regulatory Actions 
in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions, without RECLAIM Facilities 
Sample
a
 All Major Balanced Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of inspections in 
the previous year 
-1.127 -1.120 -0.855 0.073 
(0.787) (0.930) (1.058) (1.170) 
Number of enforcement 
actions in the previous year 
1.086 1.129 0.429 1.406 
(1.102) (1.117) (1.268) (1.564) 
Amount of penalty (log) in 








(0.479) (0.554) (0.558) (0.741) 
PM10 nonattainment -3.608 1.596 -0.994 -10.371 
(8.366) (12.778) (9.913) (19.436) 
PM2.5 nonattainment -2.110 -2.566 -2.369 3.790 





 8.036 19.872* 
(4.604) (6.061) (4.936) (7.708) 
Carbon monoxide 
nonattainment 
-3.771 -6.228 -2.921 -4.433 
(5.793) (7.490) (6.663) (10.288) 
Unemployment rate -2.670 -3.237 -2.995 -6.432 
(3.954) (5.002) (4.254) (8.670) 
Income (/$1000) -0.148 -0.365 -0.152 1.569 
(1.187) (1.780) (1.307) (3.213) 
Percent white -6.103 -7.906 -6.238 -7.918 
(4.039) (5.942) (4.457) (7.745) 
Observations 3,931 2,757 3,331 1,805 
Facilities 722 494 556 334 
Adjusted R-squared 0.960 0.959 0.961 0.965 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; year 
dummy variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“all,” “major,” “balanced,” and “manufacturing”) refer to the sample 












Table 28. Fixed Effects Regression of the Impact of Regulatory Actions in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions at Major Sources, 
Omitting Control Variables 
Regulatory actions
a
 Presence of Regulatory Actions Number of Regulatory Action 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inspections in the previous year 1.158 0.829 1.114 -1.162 -1.086 -1.176 
(2.620) (2.898) (2.593) (0.901) (0.854) (0.872) 
Enforcement actions in the 
previous year  
2.378 2.728 2.727 0.982 1.013 1.026 
(2.957) (3.058) (3.095) (1.098) (1.095) (1.096) 













(3.625) (3.740) (3.668) (0.432) (0.436) (0.434) 
NAAQS nonattainment (PM10, 
PM2.5, ozone, and CO) 
      
Demographic variables (income, 
unemployment, and percent white) 
      
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; NAAQS nonattainment and demographic 
variables are included in some specifications but not shown; year dummy variables included but not shown. 
a












Table 29. Fixed Effects Regression of the Impact of Regulatory Actions in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions Using a Balanced 
Panel, Omitting Control Variables 
Regulatory actions
a
 Presence of Regulatory Actions Number of Regulatory Action 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inspections in the previous year -0.713 -0.923 -0.812 -0.900 -0.900 -0.921 
(1.891) (1.998) (1.793) (1.005) (0.976) (0.989) 
Enforcement actions in the 
previous year  
2.963 3.137 3.157 0.320 0.357 0.367 
(2.801) (2.844) (2.889) (1.234) (1.228) (1.229) 






 -0.588 -0.582 -0.584 
(3.476) (3.530) (3.490) (0.448) (0.450) (0.448) 
NAAQS nonattainment (PM10, 
PM2.5, ozone, and CO) 
      
Demographic variables (income, 
unemployment, and percent white) 
      
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; NAAQS nonattainment and demographic 
variables are included in some specifications but not shown; year dummy variables included but not shown. 
a












Table 30. Fixed Effects Regression of the Impact of Regulatory Actions in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions at Manufacturing 
Facilities, Omitting Control Variables 
Regulatory actions
a
 Presence of Regulatory Actions Number of Regulatory Action 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inspections in the previous year 0.785 0.752 0.796 -0.041 -0.051 -0.109 
(3.150) (3.489) (3.023) (1.153) (1.031) (1.096) 
Enforcement actions in the 
previous year  
5.220 5.526 5.534 1.194 1.288 1.271 
(4.251) (4.411) (4.415) (1.541) (1.526) (1.533) 







(5.230) (5.308) (5.236) (0.572) (0.568) (0.572) 
NAAQS nonattainment (PM10, 
PM2.5, ozone, and CO) 
      
Demographic variables (income, 
unemployment, and percent white) 
      
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; NAAQS nonattainment and demographic 
variables are included in some specifications but not shown; year dummy variables included but not shown. 
a
 Headings refer to the type of dependent variable used in the regression. 
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Table 31. First Differences Regressions of the Impact of the Presence of Regulatory 
Actions in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions 
Sample
a
 All Major Balanced Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Presence of any inspections in 
the previous year 
0.595 1.418 1.414 2.459 
(1.931) (2.972) (2.305) (3.753) 
Presence of any enforcement 
actions in the previous year 
0.028 0.123 1.297 1.474 
(2.849) (3.292) (3.159) (5.006) 
Presence of a penalty in the 
previous year 
-2.741 -3.321 -3.350 -5.746 
(3.093) (3.519) (3.004) (5.364) 
PM10 nonattainment 0.069 6.772 1.493 -0.474 
(7.266) (11.082) (8.364) (15.163) 
PM2.5 nonattainment -2.737 -2.395 -4.251 -1.172 
(5.284) (6.911) (5.839) (6.727) 
Ozone nonattainment 5.462 7.777 -0.423 10.321
+
 






(3.191) (4.405) (3.674) (6.245) 
Unemployment rate -4.467 -5.285 -4.856 -10.604 
(3.868) (4.670) (3.922) (7.589) 
Income -0.485 -0.581 0.346 -1.022 
(1.371) (1.952) (1.308) (3.476) 
Percent white -5.040 -6.064 6.621 -5.716 
(4.501) (6.483) (4.580) (9.043) 
Observations 3,810 2,825 4,017 1,872 
Facilities 839 604 672 411 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; year 
dummy variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“all,” “major,” “balanced,” and “manufacturing”) refer to the sample 
used in the regression. 
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Table 32. First Differences Regressions of the Impact of the Number of Regulatory 
Actions in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions 
Sample
a
 All Major Balanced Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of inspections in the 
previous year 
-0.140 -0.132 -0.127 1.663 
(0.877) (1.025) (1.189) (1.651) 
Number of enforcement 
actions in the previous year 
1.342 1.397 0.282 1.727 
(1.257) (1.277) (1.222) (1.708) 
Amount of penalty (log) in 
the previous year 
-0.538 -0.598 -0.306 -0.792 
(0.362) (0.399) (0.342) (0.528) 
PM10 nonattainment 0.427 7.233 2.233 0.297 
(7.405) (11.365) (9.010) (15.472) 
PM2.5 nonattainment -2.871 -2.528 -3.053 -0.867 






(3.561) (5.598) (3.799) (4.922) 
Carbon monoxide 
nonattainment 
-7.404* -10.698* -7.750* -14.564* 
(3.284) (4.619) (3.823) (6.331) 
Unemployment rate -4.217 -4.981 -5.004 -9.222 
(3.788) (4.590) (4.053) (7.362) 
Income -0.599 -0.768 -0.551 -0.912 
(1.353) (1.967) (1.502) (3.414) 
Percent white -4.487 -5.245 -5.387 -4.822 
(4.818) (7.015) (5.396) (9.737) 
Observations 3,810 2,825 3,360 1,872 
Facilities 839 604 672 411 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; year 
dummy variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“all,” “major,” “balanced,” and “manufacturing”) refer to the sample 
used in the regression. 
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Table 33. Differences-in-Differences Regressions of the Impact of the Presence of 
Regulatory Actions in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions 
Sample
a
 All Major Balanced Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Presence of any inspections 
in the previous year 
-0.169 0.423 0.222 1.876 
(3.266) (4.977) (3.544) (6.793) 
Presence of any enforcement 
actions in the previous year 
-0.339 0.348 0.743 0.108 
(3.445) (3.945) (4.169) (5.838) 
Presence of a penalty in the 
previous year 
0.331 -0.620 -1.830 -0.400 
(3.424) (3.872) (4.101) (5.983) 
PM10 nonattainment 10.166 16.923 8.290 31.283 
(8.353) (12.937) (8.603) (19.563) 
PM2.5 nonattainment -0.440 0.774 -3.944 4.282 








(7.235) (9.166) (7.838) (14.948) 
Carbon monoxide 
nonattainment 
5.551 6.272 1.091 15.803 
(8.571) (12.793) (3.907) (14.596) 
Unemployment rate 1.066 1.421 -5.214 4.747 
(4.887) (6.590) (4.445) (8.691) 
Income -1.783 -2.890 1.307 -5.238 
(3.723) (5.638) (2.831) (8.915) 
Percent white 18.688 26.099 -2.656 72.496 
(29.249) (37.649) (33.118) (83.018) 
Observations 2,968 2,218 3,345 1,459 
Facilities 812 597 672 393 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; year 
dummy variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“all,” “major,” “balanced,” and “manufacturing”) refer to the sample 
used in the regression. 
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Table 34. Differences-in-Differences Regressions of the Impact of the Number of 
Regulatory Actions in the Previous Year on NOx Emissions 
Sample
a
 All Major Balanced Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of inspections in the 
previous year 
-0.785 -0.896 -0.937 0.586 
(0.799) (0.904) (1.038) (1.308) 
Number of enforcement 
actions in the previous year 
1.655 1.731 0.556 2.239 
(1.421) (1.438) (1.445) (1.913) 
Amount of penalty (log) in 
the previous year 
-0.252 -0.280 -0.003 -0.342 
(0.463) (0.509) (0.462) (0.705) 
PM10 nonattainment 12.242 20.698 14.629 31.955 
(9.024) (13.289) (10.161) (21.709) 
PM2.5 nonattainment -0.633 0.454 -0.032 3.957 
(7.288) (9.838) (7.745) (8.313) 
Ozone nonattainment -14.498* -18.361* -15.346* -31.051* 
(7.040) (8.836) (7.501) (13.776) 
Carbon monoxide 
nonattainment 
6.923 8.559 6.682 17.999 
(7.797) (11.910) (8.220) (11.683) 
Unemployment rate 1.569 2.248 1.194 7.462 
(4.770) (6.330) (5.364) (8.219) 
Income -1.928 -3.255 -2.181 -5.193 
(3.655) (5.556) (4.065) (8.444) 
Percent white 16.166 22.972 15.240 55.048 
(28.083) (35.871) (29.935) (78.467) 
Observations 2,968 2,218 2,688 1,459 
Facilities 812 597 672 393 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; year 
dummy variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“all,” “major,” “balanced,” and “manufacturing”) refer to the sample 
used in the regression. 
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Table 35. Coefficients of Instrumented Variables in Regressions of 
the Impact of Regulatory Actions on NOx Emissions 
Regulatory actions
a
 Presence Number 




Coefficient -4.067 3.523 
 
(Cluster-robust standard error) (7.374) (2.801) 
 
Endogeneity test p value 0.725 0.166 
 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 97.197 14.169 
 





Coefficient 6.406 0.223 
 
(Cluster robust standard error) (39.001) (2.492) 
 
Endogeneity test p value 0.844 0.492 
 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 24.953 15.522 
 
Sargan overidentification p value 0.834 0.954 




Coefficient -18.043 -4.247 
 
(Cluster robust standard error) (45.152) (8.848) 
 
Endogeneity test p value 0.711 0.383 
 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 18.789 24.953 
 
Sargan overidentification p value 0.970 0.239 
Note: none of the coefficients are significant. Coefficients for other 
lagged regulatory variables and control variables are not shown. 
a
 Column titles ( “presence” and “number”) refer to the explanatory 




ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS FOR CHAPTER II 
In this appendix, I perform several robustness tests for Chapter II. I first examine 
the impact of the maximum penalty around an air quality monitor. As previously 
discussed, the average penalty is $4,682, which is probably a small amount compared to a 
facility’s operating costs. Thus, it seems unlikely that this average penalty is much of a 
deterrent to facilities. It is possible that firms are not concerned with the average penalty; 
they might be more worried about being assessed a large penalty, and the average penalty 
is correlated with that. The facilities might be deterred by the total penalty or maximum 
penalty assessed, rather than the average penalty. Thus, for each air quality monitor, I 
find the maximum penalty assessed at surrounding facilities during that year. The mean 
of the maximum penalty is $236,291 and the standard deviation is $939,721. 
In Table 36, I examine the impact that the maximum penalty has on air quality. In 
this table, the inspection and enforcement action variables are totals or averages, and the 
penalty is the maximum penalty at all the facilities around the air quality monitor. For 
example, in regression (1), a one-unit increase in the total number of inspections reduces 
ozone concentrations by 0.007 ppb, but the coefficient is statistically insignificant. The 
coefficient of the natural logarithm of the maximum penalty in the previous year is  
-0.162. This means that increasing the maximum penalty by 1% decreases ambient ozone 
concentrations by approximately 0.002 ppb. Thus, increasing the maximum penalty from 
$1 to the average of $236,291 reduces ambient ozone concentrations by 2.01 ppb. 
Increasing the maximum penalty from the 25th percentile ($0) to the 75th percentile 
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($71,000) of the penalty distribution reduces ambient ozone concentration by 1.810 ppb.  
Regression (2) shows a similar result. Thus, it is possible that facilities are deterred by the 
largest penalties assessed around the air quality monitor. 
Next, I examine whether the results are robust to using different radii around the 
monitor to compute regulatory actions and explore possible instrumental variables. In the 
chapter, I examine monitoring and enforcement actions within a twenty-mile radius of the 
air quality monitor. To test whether the results are sensitive to the chosen radius, instead 
of counting all regulatory actions within 20 miles, I examine all regulatory actions within 
10, 15, and 30 miles. In Table 37, I present a summary of the coefficients of regulatory 
actions when I use different radii.  
The effect is fairly robust, and holds for the fifteen- and thirty-mile radius 
specifications. As shown in regressions (1) and (4), the significant effect of penalties does 
not hold in the ten-mile radius cases. This is likely due to a smaller sample size. Reducing 
the radius reduces the number of facilities surrounding each monitor and, because I drop 
all monitors that have no facilities within the radius, it also reduces the number of air 
quality monitors in the data. Nonetheless, using fifteen- and thirty-mile radii produces 
similar results as the twenty-mile radius regressions and the coefficient of penalty 
variable is negative and statistically significant.  
In the next four tables, I show the summary statistics and more detailed regression 
results for the different radii. In Table 38, I present summary statistics. It is worth noting 
that the average number of inspections and enforcement actions do not change much as 
radius increases. For instance, the average number of inspections within 10 miles is 1.89, 
the average within 15 miles is 1.79, and the average number of inspections within 30 
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miles is 1.70. If regulators focused on facilities near the monitors, then the average 
numbers should decrease as radius increases. On the other hand, the average penalty 
increases as radius increases, perhaps due to a few extraordinarily large penalties. 
Table 39 to Table 41 show the full fixed effects regressions for the different radii. 
The with the exception of regulatory variables, the coefficients are fairly similar 
regardless of radius. The magnitudes of the penalty coefficient get larger and more 
statistically significant as the radius increases: for instance, the coefficient of penalties is 
-0.114, significant at 5%, for the fifteen-mile radius; it is -0.237, significant at 1%, for the 
twenty-mile radius. Perhaps this is because regulatory actions are effective over a long 
distance, and a large penalty can improve air quality in places up to 30 miles away. 
Additionally, I explore using an instrumental variables approach. Regulatory 
actions are not random. It is likely that regulators focus their efforts on areas with poorer 
air quality. Thus, instrumental variables are appropriate. The instrumental variable has to 
be correlated with regulatory actions and otherwise uncorrelated with ozone 
concentrations. It is difficult to come up with viable instruments. Facilities in 
nonattainment areas likely face more regulatory actions. Thus, I use previous-year 
nonattainment for particulate matter and carbon monoxide as instruments. If current-year 
ozone concentrations are otherwise unrelated to previous-year nonattainment for other 
pollutants, then the exclusion restriction is fulfilled and this is a valid instrument. 
I instrument for current-year regulatory actions using previous-year nonattainment 
for carbon monoxide, PM10, and PM2.5. I instrument for the current year regulatory 
actions one at the time, using the lagged regulatory variables for the other actions. The 
regression equation is:  
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               , (24) 
where               is the instrumented regulatory action for monitor   in period  , and 
                 is a vector of the other regulatory variables, which are not 
instrumented, for monitor   in the previous period    . 
The results are presented in Table 42. When I run the fixed effects regression 
equation (24) instrumenting for the total number of inspections and using lagged 
regulatory variables for total enforcement actions and the size of penalties, the results are 
shown in the rows for inspections in column (1). The coefficient for current-year total 
inspections is -0.034, and the cluster-robust standard error is 0.121, which indicates that 
inspections do not have a significant impact on ozone concentrations. I also test whether 
the endogenous variable, current-year inspections, can be treated as exogenous. The p 
value is 0.661, and I cannot reject the null hypothesis that current-year inspections can be 
treated as exogenous. Next, I test the strength of the instruments (previous-year 
nonattainment for carbon monoxide, PM10, and PM2.5). The instrument is weak, with an 
F-statistic of 6.393, which is lower than the rule-of-thumb threshold of ten.  
I also perform the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests 
whether the instruments are exogenous. The p value is 0.025, and I can reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid. This is likely because the same pollution 
sources that cause carbon monoxide and particulate matter nonattainment also cause 
ozone pollution. Unfortunately, overall, the instruments perform quite badly. The 
instruments are weak and cannot be considered to be exogenous. I have not been able to 
find a better instrument.  
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Table 36. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Impact of Regulatory Actions 
and Maximum Penalty in the Previous Year on Ozone Concentrations 
Regulatory Actions
a
 Total Average 
  (1) (2) 




Enforcement actions in 
the previous year  
-0.003 -0.301 
(0.005) (0.366) 
Maximum penalty in the 
previous year (log) 
-0.162* -0.152* 
(0.062) (0.065) 








PM10 nonattainment -1.469 -1.518 
(1.376) (1.385) 
PM2.5 nonattainment  -3.537** -3.813** 
(0.969) (0.946) 
Percent white population 
of the county 
-0.463 -0.458 
(0.463) (0.466) 
Mean income of the 





Unemployment rate of 







July mean temperature 0.230** 0.231** 
 (0.086) (0.087) 




July mean wind speed 0.054 0.050 
 (0.147) (0.147) 
Observations 1,224 1,224 
Number of monitors 167 167 
Adjusted R-squared 0.283 0.283 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors 
in parentheses; missing weather and year dummy variables 
included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“total” and “average”) refer to the explanatory 











Table 37. Regression Coefficients of Regulatory Actions Using Different Air Quality Monitor Radii 
Regulatory Actions
a
 Total Average 
Radius 10 miles 15 miles 30 miles 10 miles 15 miles 30 miles 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






 -0.278* -0.200 -0.365
+
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.122) (0.160) (0.200) 
Enforcement actions in 
the previous year 
-0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.038 -0.126 0.012 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.253) (0.320) (0.477) 
Penalty in the previous 
year (log) 
-0.074 -0.114* -0.237** -0.102 -0.147
+
 -0.295** 
(0.057) (0.056) (0.060) (0.073) (0.076) (0.085) 
Observations 1,115 1,200 1,258 1,115 1,200 1,258 
Number of monitors 152 164 172 152 164 172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.274 0.276 0.284 0.275 0.277 0.283 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; number of 
surrounding facilities, NAAQS nonattainment, demographic variables, weather variables, and year 
dummy variables included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“total” and “average”) refer to the explanatory regulatory actions variable. 
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Table 38. Means and Standard Deviations of Explanatory Variables Using Different 
Radii 
 Ten-mile radius Fifteen-mile radius Thirty-mile radius 
Variable Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) 
Number of 
facilities 
20.169 (28.833) 35.523 (49.471) 95.904 (123.244) 
Inspections       
 Total 30.319 (48.917) 51.533 (75.29) 133.673 (170.669) 
 Average 1.888 (2.143) 1.792 (1.544) 1.698 (1.239) 
Enforcement 
actions 
      
 Total 10.408 (26.248) 18.108 (38.595) 45.386 (75.053) 
 Average 0.446 (0.912) 0.446 (0.799) 0.428 (0.614) 
Penalty       
 Total 124.755 (648.595) 221.744 (909.691) 587.357 (1,501.666) 
 Average 4.393 (22.085) 4.494 (17.320) 5.523 (20.396) 
NAAQS 
nonattainment 
      
 CO  0.124 (0.329) 0.118 (0.323) 0.115 (0.319) 
 PM10   0.438 (0.496) 0.419 (0.494) 0.406 (0.491) 
 PM2.5  0.288 (0.453) 0.278 (0.448) 0.270 (0.444) 
Unemployment 
rate 
8.039 (3.976) 8.079 (3.949) 8.142 (3.938) 
Income 37.778 (10.074) 37.639 (9.971) 37.357 (9.878) 
Percent white 81.086 (9.161) 81.602 (9.138) 82.009 (9.135) 
July weather       
 July 
temperature 
74.264 (9.659) 74.773 (9.826) 75.005 (10.098) 
 July 
precipitation 
0.027 (0.159) 0.027 (0.159) 0.032 (0.225) 
 July wind 
speed 
6.065 (2.365) 5.876 (2.161) 5.898 (2.149) 
Observations 1,115 1,200 1,258 
Monitors 152 164 172 
Source: Author’s calculations, EPA, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, U.S. Census, and National Climatic Data Center. 
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Table 39. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Impact of Regulatory Actions in the 
Previous Year on Ozone Concentrations (Radius = 10 Miles)  
Regulatory Actions
a
 Total Average 
  (1) (2) 






Enforcement actions in 
the previous year  
-0.005 0.038 
(0.010) (0.253) 












PM10 nonattainment -1.642 -1.680 
(1.489) (1.503) 
PM2.5 nonattainment  -3.215** -3.449** 
(1.008) (0.989) 
Percent white population 
of the county 
-0.156 -0.171 
(0.463) (0.458) 
Mean income of the 





Unemployment rate of 
the county  
-0.462 -0.446 
(0.336) (0.335) 
July mean temperature 0.023 0.024 
 (0.085) (0.085) 




July mean wind speed 0.070 0.076 
 (0.206) (0.205) 
Observations 1,115 1,115 
Number of monitors 152 152 
Adjusted R-squared 0.274 0.275 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors 
in parentheses; missing weather and year dummy variables 
included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“total” and “average”) refer to the explanatory 
regulatory actions variable. 
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Table 40. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Impact of Regulatory Actions 
in the Previous Year on Ozone Concentrations (Radius = 15 Miles) 
Regulatory Actions
a
 Total Average 
  (1) (2) 




Enforcement actions in 
the previous year  
-0.002 -0.126 
(0.006) (0.320) 






















PM2.5 nonattainment  -3.544** -3.787** 
(0.976) (0.959) 
Percent white population 
of the county 
-0.325 -0.324 
(0.458) (0.458) 
Mean income of the 







Unemployment rate of 







July mean temperature 0.180* 0.181* 
 (0.085) (0.086) 




July mean wind speed -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.161) (0.161) 
Observations 1,200 1,200 
Number of monitors 164 164 
Adjusted R-squared 0.276 0.277 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors 
in parentheses; missing weather and year dummy variables 
included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“total” and “average”) refer to the explanatory 
regulatory actions variable. 
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Table 41. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Impact of Regulatory Actions 
in the Previous Year on Ozone Concentrations (Radius = 30 Miles) 
Regulatory Actions
a
 Total Average 
  (1) (3) 








Enforcement actions in 
the previous year  
0.001 0.012 
(0.004) (0.477) 












PM10 nonattainment -1.382 -1.330 
(1.358) (1.369) 
PM2.5 nonattainment  -3.486** -3.804** 
(0.964) (0.940) 
Percent white population 
of the county 
-0.520 -0.550 
(0.463) (0.461) 
Mean income of the 





Unemployment rate of 
the county  
-0.506 -0.519 
(0.317) (0.314) 
July mean temperature 0.198* 0.199* 
 (0.080) (0.080) 




July mean wind speed 0.064 0.050 
 (0.141) (0.144) 
Observations 1,258 1,258 
Number of monitors 172 172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.284 0.283 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors 
in parentheses; missing weather and year dummy variables 
included but not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“total” and “average”) refer to the explanatory 
regulatory actions variable. 
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Table 42. Coefficients of Instrumented Variables in Regressions of the 
Impact of Regulatory Actions on Ozone Concentrations 
Regulatory Actions
a
 Total Average 





Coefficient -0.034 -9.673 
 
(Cluster-robust standard error) (0.121) (5.881) 
 
Endogeneity test p value 0.661 0.030 
 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 6.393 5.460 
 





Coefficient -0.021 4.192 
 
(Cluster-robust standard error) (0.056) (4.260) 
 
Endogeneity test p value 0.717 0.320 
 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 9.455 6.502 
 
Sargan overidentification p value 0.032 0.046 








(Cluster-robust standard error) (0.529) (0.659) 
 
Endogeneity test p value 0.121 0.086 
 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 5.210 5.524 
 
Sargan overidentification p value 0.085 0.102 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+
 p < 0.1; cluster-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Coefficients for other lagged regulatory variables and 
control variables are not shown. 
a
 Column titles (“total” and “average”) refer to the explanatory 
regulatory actions variable. 
 
